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The objective of this thesis is to provide Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana
[CVG] with a decision-making framework to facilitate investment planning for the
Venezuelan alumina industry. This framework of analysis reflects not only the importance
of investing in an alumina project, but implies a strong relationship with possible
development options either horizontally and/or vertically in the industry. The industry is
analyzed from a global perspective, and its main determinants evaluated: capital costs,
bauxite, energy, caustic soda, labor and alumina prices. This study further enumerates the
factors affecting alumina pricing, and discusses two models, perfect competition and
oligopoly, to describe the underlying behavior of the industry. A simulation model is
presented, which considers a Net Present Value [NPV] approach from the equity-holders'
perspective as an investment decision-rule, to appraise an alumina refinery with a capacity
of one million tons per year in Venezuela.
To accomplish the proposed objective, important questions need to be discussed:
(1) Is it worthwhile to undertake an alumina expansion project in Venezuela?; (2) what is
the comparative advantage for Venezuela to invest in alumina?; (3) if Venezuela does not
expand its domestic primary aluminum industry, can the Venezuelan alumina project
compete internationally in the free market?; and (4) what risks and uncertainties are
associated with investing in alumina refineries?
The study concludes that at this point, alumina capacity expansion in Venezuela is
not recommended. If all non-linearities, option-characterized cash flows, such as subsidies,
preferential financing, government guarantees, and tax exemptions are removed, the most
likely scenario would result in a zero-NPV outcome. Further, the alumina industry is
highly volatile and a risky business to enter. CVG should focus rather on exploiting the
possibilities of expanding its primary aluminum capacity, where clear comparative
advantages exist.
Thesis Supervisor: Paul Smoke
Assistant Professor of Political Economy and Planning.
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Introduction
The objective of this thesis is to provide Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana
[CVG]' with a decision-making framework to facilitate investment planning for the
Venezuelan alumina industry. This framework of analysis reflects not only the importance
of investing in an alumina project, but implies a strong relationship with possible
development options either horizontally and/or vertically in the industry2. The industry is
analyzed from a global perspective, and its main determinants evaluated: capital costs,
bauxite, energy, caustic soda, labor and alumina prices. This study further enumerates the
factors affecting alumina pricing, and discusses two models, perfect competition and
oligopoly, to describe the underlying behavior of the industry. A simulation model is
presented, which considers a Net Present Value [NPV] approach from the equity-holders'
perspective as an investment decision-rule, to appraise an alumina refinery with a capacity
of one million tons per year in Venezuela.
To accomplish the proposed objective, important questions need to be discussed:
(1) Is it worthwhile to undertake an alumina expansion project in Venezuela?; (2) what is
the comparative advantage for Venezuela to invest in alumina?; (3) if Venezuela does not
expand its domestic primary aluminum industry, can the Venezuelan alumina project
compete internationally in the free market?; and (4) what risks and uncertainties are
associated with investing in alumina refineries?
Alumina is the product of a bauxite refining process. Depending on quality, two to
four tons of bauxite are required to produce one ton of alumina. All refineries use basically
the same technology, but it should be modified to be appropriate to the bauxite type used in
1 Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana is a development corporation created in 1960 to
manage the Guayana Region development.
2 "Horizontally" refers to further expansion within the alumina industry, and
"vertically" refers to backward and/or forward integration into bauxite and/or primary
aluminum, respectively.
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the process. Bauxite from any given mine then, can be processed only by some of the
refineries, and similarly, each refinery can use bauxite from only some of the mines. The
refined bauxite or alumina, is then smelted to produce primary aluminum at a ratio of 1.95
tons of alumina per ton of primary aluminum. Further transformations are made to
manufacture end-user products. This thesis will study the alumina refining stage and its
relationship with bauxite and primary aluminum operations.
The Venezuelan alumina industry has an installed capacity of 1.4 million tons per
year, and is currently expanding its capacity to reach two million tons per year by the end
of 1990. The target of Venezuelan policy makers is to have a balanced and fully integrated
aluminum sector 3 capable of mining eight million tons per year of bauxite, refining four
million tons per year of alumina, and smelting two million tons per year of primary
aluminum.
The search for economic and social progress involves making the most rational use
of limited resources, such as management, capital, foreign exchange, and natural
resources. Individual investment proposals in the aluminum sector must always be
evaluated in accordance with a coherent set of policies which define the objectives for each
industry in the sector. Planning and evaluation of capital investments in alumina refining,
are increasingly complicated because of sudden changes in the price of resources, output
price volatility, government intervention, and new technological developments. Further,
aluminum sector projects often require large initial capital outlays, long lead time, and time
lags between initial investment and future returns.
The alumina market is characterized by high volatility and has no reference cycle, as
that found in primary aluminum or other products. Alumina transactions are, for those
firms outside integrated systems, primarily contractual arrangements with few spot
3 The aluminum sector is that sector which contains the bauxite, alumina and primary
aluminum industries.
transactions. In 1989, only about 5% of free-market sales were in the spot market.4 Given
time delays for alumina prices to adjust to new conditions as a result of its contractual
market nature, contract price oscillation tends to increase. Factors that might provoke
alumina prices to oscillate are primary aluminum prices, supply and demand balance in the
free-market alumina, changes in productive capacity, and different contractual agreements
among the concerned parties. To understand alumina's pricing response to these factors, it
is necessary to understand the underlying industry organization. Two models are presented:
perfect competition and oligopoly, assuming there is a price leader. Although it is beyond
the scope of this thesis to demonstrate which of the two is the underlying organization of
the industry, both are presented to shed some light on the issues that might be encountered
by any firm when analyzing potential alumina capacity expansions, as is the case for CVG.
Modern finance theory provides a general equilibrium framework for the valuation
of capital assets under uncertainty: the Capital Asset Pricing Model [CAPM]. 5 Initially
formulated in the context of perfect markets and a single holding period, it has been
extended to cover multi-period projects.6 The CAPM provides the theoretical foundations
for the NPV decision-rule whose usefulness lies in pointing out the sources of economic
value accruing to various agents involved in the project.
In evaluating capital investment decisions, in this case in the Venezuela's alumina
industry, it is not sufficient to provide the decision-maker with a project appraisal alone. In
order to make an intelligent decision, it is necessary to understand the factors affecting the
environment in which the investment is to be undertaken, i.e., the economic situation of the
country, the organization of the industry, the valuation model itself, and most important the
sources of competitive advantage that justify the investment. Finally, it is important to
4 Venalum C.A. data base.
5 To review the model, see Michael C. Jensen, "Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence", in
The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 3(2), (Autumn 1972): 357-398.
6 Eugene F. Fama, "Risk-Adjusted Discount Rates and Capital Budgeting Theory Under
Uncertainty", Journal of Financial Economics, 5(1), (August 1977): 3-24.
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answer the following question: if assuming perfect markets7 where the expected NPV is
zero, what are the sources of value that make the project's NPV greater than zero?
The study concludes that at this point, alumina capacity expansion in Venezuela is
not recommended. If all non-linearities, option-characterized cash flows, such as subsidies,
preferential financing, government guarantees, and tax exemptions are removed, the most
likely scenario would result in a zero-NPV outcome. Further, the alumina industry is
highly volatile and a risky business to enter. CVG should focus rather on exploiting the
possibilities of expanding its primary aluminum capacity, where clear comparative
advantages exist.
This thesis consists of seven chapters, organized as follows: Chapter 1 analyzes the
alumina industry vis-a-vis Venezuela's current economic situation. This industry has
changed dramatically since the energy shocks of the 1970's and 1980's, from a strong
oligopoly since its beginnings in 1900, to a more segmented industry, which is now a
quasi-competitive organization. This chapter also describes the Venezuelan aluminum
sector, its strategy and future prospects. Chapter 2 analyzes the alumina industry from a
global perspective. Chapter 3 examines issues concerning CVG-Aluminum's [CVG-AL] 8
vertical integration policy and strategic planning. Although discussed at a general level,
these issues are illustrative in defining an optimal investment plan. Chapter 4 analyzes the
cost structure of the industry, and is divided into two main sections: capital costs, which
focuses on analyzing the impact of the large initial capital outlays required for new
greenfield projects9, and operating costs, which focuses on the refinery's main operating
cost determinants: bauxite, caustic soda, labor and energy. Chapter 5 studies the underlying
organization of the alumina market and its behavior, analyzes the factors that affect alumina
7 A perfect market means the opportunity to undertake the project is available to all
competitors, which is true in the case of the alumina industry.
8 CVG-Aluminum is the organization within CVG in charge of the aluminum sector.
9 Greenfield projects are new projects which require considerable investment in
infrastructure. On the other hand, bronwfield projects are referred to as projects which
use the infrastructure facilities already in place.
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prices, and examines the impact of new capacity expansion on the industry. Chapter 6 then
presents the valuation results for a Venezuelan alumina refinery plant, with the capacity of
one million tons per year. The objective of this chapter is to provide a decision-making tool
for strategic investment planning. Chapter 7 presents the conclusions and policy
recommendations for the expansion of the Venezuelan alumina industry.
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Chapter 1
General Background
Venezuela is currently going through a restructuring program at all levels. The
target is the implementation of a set of policies that will provide the country with a
coherent, sustainable development strategy. This chapter will provide background
information on the aluminum industry, globally and in Venezuela, and the country's
economic situation for the analysis of capital investments in the alumina industry. Alumina
refining is one of the aluminum four-stage-production process, which also includes bauxite
mining, primary aluminum smelting, and aluminum semi-fabricating and manufacturing.
1.1. The Aluminum Industry.
The organization of the aluminum industry has changed from a monopoly since its
beginnings in 1900, to an oligopoly between World War II and the 1970's. Since then, the
industry has been changing towards a more segmented, quasi-competitive organization.
This pattern of evolution, typical of many mature industries, will be analyzed in this
chapter, and the aluminum production process described.
1.1.1. Brief Historical Developments.
The development of the aluminum industry is divisible into three periods. Each
period reflects changes both in the industry itself and the industry's focus on downstream
operations as main source of revenue. Prior to World War II, the monopolistic nature of
the industry in the United States was the dominant one globally. New entry and an
oligopolistic structure characterized the immediate post-war years. Recently, there has been
a new wave of independent entrants as a result of their access to low cost raw materials and
energy resources. This increasing segmentation in the industry has led to a much more
competitive organization.
The history of the aluminum industry is closely tied to its current organization. The
degree of vertical integration necessary to compete in this industry changes as its
organization changes. In its early periods during the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
competitive suppliers of alumina and/or buyers of primary aluminum simply did not exist.
This forced pioneer companies to integrate their operations. In the immediate post-World
War II years, the advent of new entrants, as a consequence of Alcoa's divestiture, resulted
in a opening of the arm-length alumina market10 .
The surplus alumina position11 of pioneer companies, and because of the sudden
increase in energy prices during the 1970's, permitted new entrants to enter the industry at
the primary aluminum stage only. New primary smelters arose principally in areas with
access to low-cost energy resources. Consequently, since then, a more segmented, quasi-
competitive organization has characterized the industry.
This industry evolution is consistent with the general life-cycle theory of
integration, i.e., that competitive markets can only become established when the market is
large enough to support buyers and suppliers at a minimum efficient scale. When this stage
is reached, vertical integration incentive declines, and the industry organization leads to a
competitive environment. 12
1.1.2. Aluminum Industry Production Process.
It is useful at this point to describe the primary aluminum production process and its
derivative products. The production of aluminum involves a series of different processes
10 An arm-length market is defined as the market where transactions are made between
unrelated parties.
11 Long position is an available surplus for the free-market after covering internal
requirements. Short position is defined as the dependence on the free-market to cover
internal requirements.
12 Arnoldo C. Hax and Nicolds S. Majluf, Strategic Management: An Integrative
Perspective. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984), pp. 182-208, and Edward H. Forbes and
Thomas J. Bate, II, "The Life Cycle Approach to Strategic Planning", unpublished master
thesis, Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA., 1980.
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that can be thought of as a vertical integrated production chain from upstream mining to
downstream fabricated products. 13 Upstream, the industry's commercial history and
available technology have been relatively invariant, allowing the chain of production to be
broken into a set of well recognized and technically independent stages.
Each stage of production combines the output of the previous stage with an array of
other goods and services, to produce the output for the next stage. Bauxite mines produce a
mineral called bauxite and alumina refineries produce a semi-processed mineral called
alumina. Primary smelters produce a metal called primary aluminum or primary, which
includes a variety of alloys and shapes such as sheet ingot, casting ingot, and extrusion
billet. Fabrication mills produce a wide range of products such as plates, tubes, and cables,
which are shaped from primary aluminum. Figure 1 depicts the various aluminum
production stages.
The first stage in the production process is the mining of bauxite, an ore composed
of a mixture of minerals of at least 30% recoverable alumina. Bauxite is not a homogeneous
ore, and differs in composition across deposits and sometimes within the same deposit.
While alumina content is its most important variable, other variables and impurities also
have important implications in the technology and cost of processing bauxite. Commercial
prospects for a given bauxite deposit depend upon alumina and organic content, as well as
impurities, availability of local infrastructure, distance from the refineries, and the bauxite
market price.
Bauxite is refined into alumina by the Bayer process, 14 in which two to five tons of
bauxite are required to produce one ton of alumina. All refineries use the Bayer process
technology, however, each refinery must modify this process to suit the type of bauxite
13 Upstream are the activities that involve bauxite mining and alumina refining.
Downstream are activities related to semi-fabricated and fabricated products.
14 A.R. Barkin, Production of Aluminum and Alumina, Published on behalf of the Society
of Chemical Industry, J. Wiley, 1987.
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Figure 1. Stages and Flows in Aluminum Production.
Non metallic uses
(e.g. abrasive uses)
Source: Merton Peck, The World Aluminum Industry in a Changing Era, Washington D.C.,
Resources for the Future, John Hopkins University Press, 1988)
used. Substantial economies of scale exist in alumina refineries, with a minimum efficient
scale approximately 700,000 tons per year, including the necessary infrastructure.
Primary aluminum metal is produced from alumina at a ratio of approximately two
tons of alumina per one ton of primary aluminum, by the Hall-Herault process. 15 Though
several variations to this process exist, their economics are similar. Primary smelters
consist of individual pots arranged in one or more pot-lines. Economies of scale are
significant, but not as large as in the case of alumina refineries. 16 For a single smelter, the
efficient scale is between 100,000 to 130,000 tons per year.
Primary aluminum is used to make fabricated aluminum products through a variety
of processes common to metalworking, such as rolling, casting, and extruding.
Fabrications are used to manufacture items ranging from window frames, household foil,
and engine blocks to aircraft wings. In terms of application, aluminum is second only to
steel. Manufacturing operations are small in scale compared to those performed at smelters
and refineries. Although economies of scale are usually not significant, for operations such
as sheet, plate, and foil mills, there is a minimum efficient scale of 50,000 tons per year.
Like most metal industries, the aluminum industry generates scrap from its operations and
final products re-usage. The scrap is used in secondary smelting, which can be substituted
for primary aluminum in most uses. 17 Finally, the processes used in the various stages of
production have undergone few fundamental changes since the beginnings of the industry.
Major improvements have focussed on increasing technology productivity and improving
quality of outputs.
15 Ibid.
16 Compared in terms of relative primary units.
17 Merton Peck, The World Aluminum Industry in a Changing Era, (Washington D.C.,
Resources for the Future, John Hopkins University Press, 1988).
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1.2. The Venezuelan Situation.
The Venezuelan aluminum industry typifies industrial development in Venezuela
and is the result of an intentional government industrial policy, the development of energy-
intensive industries, linked to the hydroelectric infrastructure in the Guayana region in
development since the 1960's. In this section we will explain briefly the current economic
situation of Venezuela and its aluminum industry.
1.2.1. Overview of the Economic Situation.
For the past 20 years, Venezuela has failed to invest its revenues from natural
resources, especially from oil, into productive assets growth. This situation has come about
because of, in the absence of a coherent and feasible development strategy, 18 the
implementation of a set of different, often contradictory, policies, and increased direct
economic controls and subsidies by the government. As a consequence, the system was
incapable of generating sufficient growth from its productive capacity. Venezuela today
remains highly dependent on oil which, until the 1986 collapse in oil prices, provided about
95% of its export earnings. 19 The country remains exposed to the volatility in oil prices,
and more important, other productive industries remain underdeveloped. 20 Implemented
policies have failed to address the problem of poverty effectively in government's
development policies. In spite of continuous efforts, Venezuela's public sector is still
inefficient and does not provide the basis needed for modernizing government operations to
support a sustainable development strategy.
18 Based on the World Bank Report prepared for Venezuela, November, 1988.
19 Banco Central de Venezuela, La Economfa Venezolana en los Ultimos Treinta y Cinco
afnos (1987). See also, Harvard Business School, Venezuela 1988, (N9-389-034, 1989).
20 Underdeveloped is defined as a strong dependency on Government policies and/or the
incapacity to compete in the international market.
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Relatively high growth rates of real GNP were achieved from 1960 to 1973 by
taking advantage of the financial resources and foreign exchange provided by oil.2 1 During
the 1970's, starting with the 1973 oil boom, the government's role expanded, characterized
by a rapid increase in direct production, promotional activities, and regulatory
interventions. Industrial development was heavily promoted, based on energy-intensive
industries such as steel, aluminum and petrochemicals; an effort which fostered large
infrastructure investments, including large hydroelectric developments.
Simultaneously, due to depressed relative prices for traded goods, the industrial
sector became dependent on government promotional policies. Government policies
encouraged changes in factor use toward less intensive use of labor, more intensive use of
land and capital, and more generalized use of imported inputs. 22 However, the magnitude
of the public sector investment program in 1974-78 proved too ambitious, and
inefficiencies in the use of resources were substantial. As a result, during 1978-79, the
government was forced to undertake contractional policies characterized by investment cut
backs.
During the 1980's, despite a second oil boom in 1980, production also declined as
inappropriate policies encouraged capital flight rather than growth; however, inflation was
moderate from 1982 to 1986.23 Between 1986 and 1988, although policy again shifted to
stimulation and GNP growth was about 6%, this growth was characterized by a sharp
deterioration in the balance of payments and by increasing inflation. In 1986 average
Venezuelan oil prices fell by almost 50%, from $25.7 per barrel in 1985 to just $13.6 per
barrel in 1986.24 The government responded to this situation by drawing down external
reserves and pursuing short-term financing policies.
21 Banco Central de Venezuela, La Economfa Venezolana en los Ultimos Treinta y Cinco
al.&, 1987.
22 Based on interviews in various industrial sectors.
23 Ibid.
24 Based on interviews in the oil sector.
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By the end of 1988, Venezuela's economic situation had become critical: operating
reserves were depleted, and imports were increasing, as it was clear that the government
would implement a major devaluation. Inflation continued to accelerate, and by January
1989, there were substantial shortages of primary goods in the markets. High levels of
uncertainty in all sectors set up a critical situation.
In light of this situation, in 1989 the new government initiated a program to redefine
the role of the public sector. The objective was to reduce the participation in direct
investment, and to restructure the complex regulatory and institutional framework which
distorted the economy. Equally important, the program was expected to encourage private
sector activity and investment in the aluminum and petrochemical sectors, and various
medium and small industries.
1.2.2. Summary of the Venezuelan Aluminum Industry.2 5
The Venezuelan aluminum industry is owned by the government and managed by
Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana [CVG]. Its underlying objective is to help diversify
the Venezuelan economy from the oil sector. CVG-Aluminum [CVG-AL] is now under
expansion due to expected increases in world aluminum demand.26 The sources of value
for the Venezuelan aluminum industry stem from low cost of energy and labor, and close
proximity to the sources of raw materials. 27 CVG-AL's target is to produce two million
tons per year of primary aluminum within a balanced, vertical integrated structure.
Figure 2 shows the location of the aluminum industry in Venezuela. Located around
Puerto Ordaz, about 600 km from the capital of Caracas, it is composed of an alumina
refinery run by Interalumina C.A., two smelters run by Alcasa C.A. and Venalum C.A.,
25 This section is based on information from CVG-Planificaci6n Corporativa and CVG-
Subsidiaries' Corporate Plans.
26 Shearson-Lehman-Hutton, Annual Review of the World Aluminum Industry 1989, (pp.
41-48).
27 Venalum C.A., Plan Corporativo 1989-1993., p.75.
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Figure 2. Location of the Aluminum Sector in Venezuela.
Caribbean Sea Atlantic Sea
Orinoco River
Source: Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum
and the Los Pijiguaos bauxite mine run by Bauxiven C.A. The primary smelters and
refinery are located together along the Orinoco River close to Puerto Ordaz, having
available a well-developed infrastructure system. These plants also have the benefit of
being close to the Guri dam, which provides hydroelectric power to the smelters; and to
low-cost natural gas in the case of the alumina refinery. However, the mine is located about
600 km from Puerto Ordaz in an undeveloped area requiring high infrastructure investment
and an effective solution to bauxite transportation from the mine to the refinery. The
location of the industry along the Orinoco River provides an easy and cheap transportation
route.
1.2.2.1. CVG-Aluminum [CVG-AL] Company Profile.
CVG-AL, the organization within CVG in charge of managing the aluminum
sector, is involved in all stages of the aluminum production process. The corporation's goal
is to develop a balanced, vertically integrated industry from bauxite to primary aluminum.
The structure of the CVG-AL presented in Figure 3 shows the current and planned
capacities at each stage of production. Industry inputs for the industry are sourced by
PDVSA [Petr6leos de Venezuela S.A.], which provides CVG with the natural gas required
by Interalumina C.A. as its main source of energy, and some of the inputs for the carbon
anodes production required for primary aluminum smelting. PDVSA is expected to cover
all caustic soda requirements for alumina refining now imported in its totality. The energy
required by the smelters is generated at the Guri dam, while needed carbon anodes are
mainly imported, along with some quantity provided by CVG-Carbonorca C.A. In the
future, it is expected that Carbonorca C.A. will totally cover all primary aluminum industry
requirements. Table 1 is self-explanatory, and shows the current capacity of the industry
and its future plans.
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Figure 3. Structure of the Venezuelan Aluminum Industry.
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Curent Capacity 800K tpy
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C.V.G. Interalumina
Current Capacity 2m tpy
Planned Capacity 4m tpy
CurrentlyImported
Planned PDVSA
Caustic
Soda Currently Imported
I Planned PDVSA
PDVSA
Edelca
Source: Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum C.A.
Gas
Electricity
C.V.G. Alcaa 
-Venalum
Current Capacities 210K-460K tpy
Planned Addition of seven smelter
Cabn Anodes
Primary Aluminum
C.V.G.-Alcasa
Semi-fabrication Plants
Electricity
Table 1. General Summary of the Venezuelan Aluminum Sector.
Resources
Bauxite
Expansion
Alumina
Aluminum
Carbon Anodes
Electrical Energy
Natural Gas
Petroleum Coke
Coal Tar Pitch
Caustic Soda
Aluminum Technical
manpower.
Present Capacity
460K tpy
2.4m tpy
1.3m tpy
670K tpy
140K tpy
10K megWatts
n/a
280K tpy
60K tpy
1OOK tpy
12K
Source
Los Pijiguaos.
Imported.
Interalumina Refinery.
Alcasa-Venalum Smelters.
Existing captive plants
Carbonorca Central
anode plant.
Edelca - Electrification
Caroni Hydro-Power.
Petroleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA)-Corpoven.
U.S.A imports
U.S.A / Europe
U.S.A
CVG-Aluminum
Future Capacity
8.Om tpy
Remarks
Bauxiven C.A.
--0--
4.Om tpy
2.Om tpy
1.2m tpy
26K megWatts
900k tpy
180K tpy
300K tpy
30K
Interalumina expansion
and new refinery.
Further Alcasa expansion
and seven new smelters.
Carbonorca I and and
expansion to 750K tpy.
New Hydro-Electric
Plants.
Capacity available for all
operations.
PDVSA Project plus
imports.
Imports. Also, research
for blending petroleum
pitch with coal tar pitch.
Imports / Project in phase
to produce caustic soda
(PDVSA).
Increase aluminum
technical manDower base.
Source: Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum C.A. September-1989.
Resources
CVG-AL revenues are almost entirely due to sales of primary aluminum. Sales of
alumina and downstream products amount to less than 20% of the total. 28 Therefore,
revenues are not especially sensitive to movements in the price of alumina or downstream
products. Because of significant bauxite requirements, CVG-AL's position is sensitive to
changes in bauxite prices as long as its alumina operations depend on imported bauxite.
However, the negative impact of bauxite prices on revenues is expected to decline as
domestic bauxite production increases.
Huge cost advantages stemming from cheap hydroelectric power put CVG-AL in a
particularly strong position in the primary aluminium industry. 29 As shown by this study,
CVG-AL's emphasis should be on primary production in spite of its exposure to primary
price fluctuations. Alumina production is also competitive, but less so than primary.
Bauxite costs are high, and will probably remain so until Bauxiven C.A. reaches full,
efficient production.
28 CVG-Planificaci6n Corporativa data base.
29 CVG has the potential of becoming the lowest primary producer in the industry as a
result of the low-energy tariff for the industry.
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Chapter 2
The Alumina Industry - Baseline Analysis
This chapter analyzes the alumina industry from the perspective of the alumina free-
market. The objective is to study the alumina transactions made outside integrated systems
to avoid possible distortions in the use of internal transfer pricing policies. We will first
look at strategic groups involved in the alumina industry, the classification of which
resulted from grouping companies according to degree of vertical integration, alumina
position, 30 and, to a lesser extent, historical development. This chapter also analyzes
alumina industry concentration, barriers to entry, cost structure, and a sensitivity analysis
on the main cost determinants: investment costs, bauxite, caustic soda, energy and labor.
Finally, it presents a baseline recommendation on expanding alumina capacity.
2.1. Strategic Groups.
This section analyzes the different strategic groups and defines their main
characteristics and interests. The relationships among the strategic groups depicted in
Figure 4 show the different groups and their relationship through their alumina and bauxite
transactions. This figure is defined by two dimensions: the degree of vertical integration
and the alumina position. From the figure, two points are important to note: Miners and
Refiners are located within the same group, given their similarities in characteristics and
interests. As explained later in Chapter 3, the strong dependence between Miners and
Refiners makes it necessary to consolidate them into one strategic group. The arrows
represents the flow of alumina and/or bauxite from one group to another.31
3 0 Alumina position is defined as long or short. Long position refers to the availability of
alumina to the free-market after all the internal requirements have been fulfilled. Short
position refers to the dependency on the free-market to fulfill alumina requirements.
31A sixth group, defined as Independent Fabricators, would complete the list of groups
within the aluminum industry; however, since there is no relationship of this group with
alumina, it was excluded from the analysis.
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Figure 4. Strategic Groups Relationships.
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Source: Based on Classification made by Colin Pratt, "Is Vertical Integration in Aluminum
Really Necessary". Prepared for: Metal's Week Second Aluminum Symposium, (1989).
To specify the location of each group within the aluminum industry production
process, Figure 5 shows a simplified version of the process depicted in the aluminum
production figure [Figure 1]. The location of each group depends on its free-market
position at each stage of production. Differentiation is made between the integrated system,
where products flow through internal transfers with no interaction with other producers
and/or buyers, and the free-market segment, which represents the arm-length transactions
side. The existence of the Miners and Refiners in the bauxite and alumina stages is notable.
As explained before, mines and refineries are dependent on one another due to bauxite
mineralogy. Also, at the end of the production process it is shown that Independent
Fabricators' group represents the demand side for arms-length primary aluminum
transactions. The analysis of this group is beyond the scope of this study.
After locating each of the strategic groups in the process and seeing their relation to
one other, each is now defined: The "Integrated Majors" and "Second-Tier Producers"
groups are very similar in characteristics and interests. Both groups are characterized by
their strong integration of primary aluminum and down-stream operations. 32 Both are
focused on down-stream markets as their main source of revenues. Table 2 shows the
firms included in each group. 33
Apart from size and history, the alumina balance is what distinguishes the
Integrated Majors from Second-Tier Producers. Contrary to the Second-Tiers alumina
position, the Integrated Majors group includes the six companies substantially long in
alumina. In 1989 this group controlled more than 60% of the free-market alumina supply to
firms short in alumina.34 Although some of the members are closely balanced in primary
32 Colin Pratt, "Is Vertical Integration in Aluminum Really Necessary?," Prepared for:
Metals Week's Second Aluminum Symposium, (1989), pp. 9-11.
33 For locating each company in its country of origin, see International Primary
Aluminum Institute [IPAIL Statistical summary, Volume 4 (part), (1987-1988): 30-34.
34 Shearson-Lehman-Hutton, Annual Review of the World Aluminum Industry, (1989),
pp.41-48.
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Figure 5. Location of Strategic Groups in the Production Proccess.
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and may, in certain circumstances, be in a short position, they are characterized by being
long in aluminum production. This group however, is no longer the main supplier of the
aluminum free-market, currently dominated by the Independent Smelters group.
Table 2. Integrated Majors and Second-Tier Producers.
Integrated Majors Second-Tier Producers
Alumina Long: Alumina Balance:
Alcoa Alumix
Alcan Inespal
Kaiser
Pechiney Alumina Short:
Alusuisse VAW
Noranda Aluminum
Alumax
Austria Metal
Hoogovens
Granges
Source: Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum C.A.
The main concern for both the Integrated Majors and Second-Tier Producers is the
maintenance of a stable pricing system of downstream products. Important for this group is
the decline in concentration of downstream markets due to the entry of new Independent
Fabricators. Even though sales of primary aluminum are not an important source of
revenue for the Integrated Majors and Second-Tiers, these groups are not indifferent to
volatility in the primary price. Primary prices exercise pressure on semi-fabricated prices,
and low prices in the primary market create entry opportunities for new Independent
Fabricators, reducing the Majors' and Second-Tiers' respective market shares.
The "Miners/Refiners" group traditionally has been a small and weak strategic
group. Closely linked because of bauxite physical heterogeneity and its market
imperfections, there is a strong dependence between bauxite miners and alumina refiners.
The growth of this group has not been matched by the growth of the Independent Smelters
group. This is because refining plants are associated with high initial capital outlays, large
minimum efficient scale, and high volatility in the output's price. These facts imply that an
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alumina refinery is an expensive and risky project. Further, a large part of the alumina
required by Independent Producers is supplied by the Majors group, which collectively run
a large alumina surplus. Table 3 shows the firms included in the "Miner/Refiners" group.
Table 3. Miner/Refiners.
Refiners: Miners:
Billiton IBA Member States
Alcoa of Australia e.g. Guyana
Comalco Indonesia
Jamaican Government Greek Bauxite Producers
MRN
Source: Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum C.A.
The main concerns of this group are the possibility to capitalize on low-cost bauxite
and energy, and the existence of a balanced, alumina free-market so that prices are not
driven down by overcapacity. Finally, Miners/Refiners are also interested in stable alumina
contracts to avoid output price volatility.
The "Independent Smelters" group, except for CVG 35 and to some extent
Comalco, are predominantly primary aluminum producers and are not developed, if at all,
downstream. The reason Independent Producers entered the aluminum industry was the
access to a low-cost energy source, and for most of them this remains as main source of
competitive advantage. Independent Producers are the most recent entrants in the industry,
and except for CVG, the firms in this group are short of alumina, and depend on supplies
from one of the Integrated Majors and/or the Miners/Refiners for their alumina needs. Table
4 shows the companies included in this group.
35 CVG is located in this group only temporarily due to its changing balance. Currently
its position is not clearly defined. The stated policy is vertical integration, although
CVG's position is clearly unbalanced with a long alumina and a short bauxite position.
CVG is included in this group because its origin was as an independent smelter given its
low energy cost position. However, CVG's current interests lie between that of Independent
Producers and of Miners/Refiners.
33
Table 4. Independent Smelters.
Short of Alumina: Balanced/Long in Alumina:
Aluvic CVG
CVRD Comalco
SGF
Hydro-Aluminum
Elkem
Aluminum Bahrain
Dubai Aluminum
Aluar
Alusaf
Egyptalum
Source: Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum C.A.
Independent Smelters maximize their profits when primary aluminum prices are
relatively high and, coinciding with the Majors Group, when alumina prices are low. Since
their key advantage is low energy cost, Independent Smelters should focus their future
plans on capacity expansion within the smelting stage. If expansion exceeds the overall
market growth, they may need to capture market share from the Majors group. Otherwise,
overcapacity might drive primary aluminum prices down.
2.2. Market Concentration.
In theory, forward integration by monopolists or oligopolists can enable them to
practice price discrimination between different markets. 36 Price discrimination in the
alumina industry occurs when different transfer pricing policies are used, dependent on the
buyer and the contractual agreements of the parties concerned. Although the alumina
industry can change to a more competitive industry as concentration declines, the
concentration of vertically integrated producers is expected to remain high, especially
Alcoa. 37 Up to the mid-1970's, the alumina market could be said to be characterized by
36 F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, (Second Edition),
Rand McNally College, 1980, (pp.315-319).
37 Until the 1960's the alumina market simply did not exist and primary producers were
forced to backward integrate.
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sticky, administered pricing, such that the market failed to clear through price.38 Since
then, a declining market concentration has led to a more competitive environment 39 where
prices are more responsive to changes in alumina supply and/or demand. See Table 5 and
Figure 6 which show the concentration levels for the alumina market in 1988.
As shown in Table 6, the trend for shares of the six Majors in the alumina market
has been in a continuous decline. The arm-length market is expected to increase in size,
although Alcoa's concentration is expected to remain.40 The implication is that while
alumina market size and liquidity will increase, market concentration will decrease. Because
of this, new entrants will have an incentive to join the Independent Smelters group, taking
advantage of competitive alumina prices.
2.3. Cost Structure.
Although infrastructure costs are not considered explicitly, they would represent
important costs for greenfield projects in developing countries. Fixed capital costs which
vary from refinery to refinery depending on location, infrastructure needs, and future
plans, constitute about $700-1,200 per ton of installed capacity.4 1 As for any industrial
plant, unit capital costs for alumina refineries diminish with increasing plant size. Minimum
efficient scale is reached at about 700,000 tons per year.
Table 7 presents the operating costs distribution of alumina refining, based on raw
materials, energy labor, and other costs (this cost structure analysis is expanded in Chapter
3). As shown in the table, cost advantage in alumina production stems from the proximity
38 John A. Stuckey, Vertical Integration and Joint Ventures in the Aluminum Industry,
(Cambridge MA., Harvard University Press), 1983. pp. 88-91.
39 Colin Pratt, Is vertical Integration in Aluminum Really Necessary?, Prepared for:
Metals week's Second Aluminum Symposium, 1989, pp.9-11.
40 Ibid.
41 Frank A. McCawley, and Luke H. Baumgardner, Aluminum, (Preprinted) from Bulletin
675. Mineral Facts and Problems, 1985 Edition, Bureau of Mines, pp. 15-16, and Venalum
C.A. data base.
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Table 5. Concentration in the Alumina Market, 1989.
Company '000 tpy. % Cumulative
Alcoa 8,560 26.8 26.8
Alcan 4,080 12.8 39.6
Reynolds 2,570 8.1 47.7
Pechiney 2,310 7.2 54.9
Kaiser 2,000 6.3 61.2
Billiton 1,646 5.2 66.4
CVG 1,344 4.2 70.6
Comalco 1,180 3.7 52.9
Alusuisse 1,140 3.6 77.9
Inespal 1,140 3.6 81.5
Source: Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum C.A.
Table 6. Shares of the Six Majors: 1955, 1963, 1971, 1979, and 1988.
Company 1955 1963 1971 1979 1988
Alcoa 24.8 18.0 23.0 27.6 26.8
Alcan 27.3 26.3 19.0 13.9 12.8
Reynolds 16.9 15.4 11.1 9.2 8.1
Kaiser 12.3 11.7 12.2 9.4 6.3
Pechiney 5.1 8.6 11.0 8.9 7.2
Alusuisse 4.2 4.6 2.9 4.8 3.6
Total 90.6 84.6 79.2 73.8 64.8
Source: John A. Stuckey, Vertical Integration and Joint Ventures in the Aluminum
Industry., Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 84.
Figure 6a. Distribution of Alumina refining Capacity in 1988.
Source: Shearson-Lehman-Hutton. Annual Review of the World Aluminium, 1989, p. 45.
Source: Shearson-Lehman-Hutton. Annual Review of the World Aluminium, 1989, p. 45.
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Figure 6b. Alumina Refining Capacity Controlled by the Six
Majors, 1988.
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to a low-cost source of bauxite and the low-cost source of energy and caustic soda. For a
non-integrated firm, alumina supply has been of high variability, resulting in an
unpredictable market. However, we could expect a more segmented market in the medium
term, where competitive pricing might prevail.
Table 7. Alumina Operating Costs Variations, 1989.
Total Bauxite Caustic Labor Energy Other
Mean ($/tn) 127 43.9 22.0 18.0 33.6 9.5
As % of Total 100 34.5 17.3 14.2 26.4 7.6
Std. Deviation 27.2 22.0 6.9 9.9 14.1 2.4
Source: Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum C.A.
2.4. Alumina Prices.
Spot and contract alumina prices have been characterized by high volatility and, in
contrast to primary aluminum prices, alumina prices do not follow any reference cycle.
Figure 7 shows the alumina and bauxite prices imported into the United States. Bauxite and
alumina prices generally move together, although when the alumina market is in tight
balance, as in 1982 and during the last two years, alumina prices are more volatile than
bauxite prices. Given the dependence between mines and refineries, usually governed by a
vertical structure organization, bauxite transactions are usually made, on a cost-plus basis.
This type of contractual agreement will recognize a band for the bauxite operations' profit
margin, which will increase as alumina prices increase, as in 1982. However, if the price
of alumina is too high, there is a limit to bauxite prices imposed by escalation formulas
used to set a floor and a ceiling price for the product. In the last two years, bauxite prices
increased, but not as much as alumina prices. What, then, causes alumina prices to
fluctuate so much?
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Figure 7. Prices of Alumina and Bauxite imported into US (Current $).
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Figure 8 shows the alumina and aluminum prices imported into the U.S. As we can
see, there are clear time lags between the two markets, created mainly by time delays in
renegotiating alumina contracts resulting from a market characterized by contractual
transactions with few spot sales. The primary aluminum price, however, is not the only
factor affecting alumina prices. Prices also depend on the negotiation power of the parties
concerned, the balance position of supply and demand for the free-market, and the distance
between the refiner and the buyer, explained in detail in Chapter 5.
2.5. Barriers to Entry.
Clearly, low operating costs are a major source of competitive advantage, and
access to them represents a major barrier for new entrants in alumina production, resulting
in a cost-focused industry. The sources of cost advantage are primarily natural resource-
based, such as low-cost bauxite deposits, usually in the hands of host governments. They
play a major role in the alumina refining stage, especially in developing countries.
Industrial policy, such as subsidized transfer pricing and long-term arrangements for low-
energy tariffs, is the main instrument for promoting the industry. Governments might also
encourage the development of their state-owned enterprise through tax benefits and low-
interest, long-term financing.
As for any capital-intensive industry, alumina refineries require high initial capital
investments, about $700-1,200 per ton, plus contingencies and required infrastructure
investments as initial outlay.4 2 The most important risks associated with this investment
are imperfect input markets and cost variability, excessive output price volatility, political
risk in the case of smelters located in unstable countries, or dependence on sources of
supply from risky countries, volatility of exchange rates, and the cyclical nature of the
business due to its correlation with the economy business cycle.
40
42 Ibid.
Figure 8. Alumina Contract Prices in US and Metals Week Aluminum Prices. (Current $).
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Given the historical, dominant vertical integration structure in the industry, alumina
distribution channels have been controlled by major integrated producers. However, due to
increasing fragmentation of the industry as a whole, there are new distribution channels
related to Independent Refiners, thus reducing market failure risk.4 3 The technology is
owned by firms in the Integrated Majors group. Even though technology is fairly
homogeneous, it is costly for new entrants to gain access, and technical expertise as well.
Especially for developing countries, greenfield projects have infrastructure needs which
represent a high-cost entry barrier to the industry. On average, infrastructure requirements
could increase initial capital outlays between $100-400 per ton.44
2.6. Sensitivity to Major Alumina Investment Determinants.
After describing the main determinants in the alumina industry, this section now
presents baseline results, and their sensitivity to the most important variables: investment
costs, bauxite costs, and alumina prices. Our aim is to draw a baseline conclusion as a
framework for a further detailed analysis on the issues raised in this chapter. The results
and sensitivity analysis are based on the simulation model described in Chapter 6, and the
figures presented are drawn from the results using the base case simulation parameters
presented in Table 8.
As shown in Figures 9-11, the base case scenario which assumes an above average
state-of-the-world 45 results in a just positive NPV. Even though neither option equivalents
nor terminal values cash flows are considered in the valuation model [see assumptions in
Chapter 6], the results show the expected zero-NPV outcome coinciding with our initial
expectations. This outcome might be explained by the fact that (1) alumina is an
intermediate good, for which there is no developed market, (2) the parameters are based on
43 Colin Pratt, "Is vertical Integration in Aluminum Really Necessary?," Prepared for:
Metals Week's Second Aluminum Symposium, 1989.
44 Venalum C.A. data base.
45 States-of-the-World can be pessimistic, average, or optimistic.
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data as if the project were to be built in Venezuela by CVG-AL which, as shown later, does
not have clear competitive advantages in alumina production, and (3) the market dominance
of contractual agreements, in principle, are zero-NPV agreements if risks are assumed to be
well diversified.
Table 8. Base Case Simulation Parameters.
Alumina Price 275($/on)
Alumina Production Schedule ('000 ton,year)
(100,3);(650,4);(900,5);( 1000,5-22)
Inflation Rate 1.04 (l+%Iyear)
Investment Costs 800,000 ($'000)
Construction Period 3 (Years, 2<>6)
Percentage Construction Completion per Year (l,20%);(2,40%);(3,40%) (%,year)
Depreciation Period 20 (Years)
Bauxite Costs 25 ($/ton Bauxite)
Caustic Soda Costs 200 ($/ton Caustic Soda)
Energy Costs 15 ($/ton Alumina)
Labor Costs 15 ($/ton Alumina)
Equity Participation 30(%)
Debt Participation 70(%)
Interest Rate on Debt 10(%)
Debt Repayment Period 15 (Years)
Pre-opening and Organization Costs 8,200 ($'000)
Amortization Period for Preop.&Org.Costs 5 (Years)
Unleveraged Beta for the Project 0.92
Risk Free Rate 0.08
Market Risk Premium 0.08 6
In terms of risk, alumina investments are highly sensitive to alumina prices, bauxite
costs, and investment costs, as depicted in Figures 9-11. Because of the high sensitivity to
alumina prices and their volatility, refineries will be forced to hedge their positions such
that, if risks are well diversified, will result in expected zero-NPV investments.46 Also,
alumina sensitivity to environmental conditions, such as humidity, makes alumina
transportation difficult and does not permit the product to be stored for more than two
months, increasing the risky nature of alumina investment.
46 Hedge refers to the elimination of any risk by protecting the investment from any
downturn at the cost of giving up the upside potential.
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Figure 9. Sensitivity to Alumina Prices ($/ton).
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Figure 10. Sensitivity to Bauxite Costs, ($/ton).
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Figure 11. Sensitivity to Investment Costs, ($/ton Alumina).
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Finally, given the high initial capital outlays required, the uncertainties of the
market, the risky nature of the project, and CVG-AL's currently long in alumina, we do not
recommend at this point expanding alumina capacity in Venezuela. To support this
assessment, strategic issues across the alumina industry, its cost structure, and the
valuation model cited in this section are detailed in the following chapters. Our objective is
to present a complete analysis that not only considers the project appraisal, but also
analyzes the factors that affect the organization of the industry, and responsiveness of the
input and output markets to changes in capacity.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Issues for the Alumina Industry
The structure governing the linkages between alumina-bauxite operations, and
alumina-primary aluminum operations represents an important planning and strategic
decision for CVG-Aluminum. This chapter examines on a general level the issues
concerning the integration between bauxite mining and alumina refining, and the integration
of primary aluminum and alumina operations. This discussion lays down the issues to
define what should be the optimal degree of vertical integration across the alumina industry.
3.1. Integration Between Bauxite Mining and Alumina Refining.
Non-homogeneity and highly imperfect markets are characteristics for bauxite.
Refineries depend on particular bauxites, implying high switching costs in changing from
one bauxite to another. Therefore, mines and refineries are dependent on each other in
long-term relationships. In addition, bauxite is a low value product whose transportation
costs represent a high proportion, approximately 50%, of its cif price. The interrelationship
between mine and refiner due to bauxite internal properties favors a refinery location close
to the mine supplier.
The mutual dependence of miner and refiner and their close physical location need
not necessarily lead to bauxite-alumina vertical integration. They could be independent
entities, with their transactions governed by long-term contracts. However, this condition
represents a bilateral monopoly bargaining situation, in which neither buyer nor seller has
any other rational alternative.47 The pricing terms of contracts are indeterminate, and even
when concluded by negotiations, would tend to break down as external conditions change.
No matter how comprehensive the contractual terms, the contracts would always be
47 F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, (Second Edition),
Rand McNally College, 1980.
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incomplete. As a consequence, bauxite transactions, in general, are internalized between the
mine and the refinery by internal transfer prices, and there is no reason to believe that this
will change in the future.48
But vertical integration has not eliminated the need to place a value on bauxite, for
which no single free-market price exists. The reason is basically the scale mismatch
between mines and refineries. In the 1960's and 1970's huge bauxite deposits were
developed in Australia, Guinea and Brazil.49 These mines still dominate the world bauxite
supply. If developed as vertically integrated projects, each of these mines would have
required the construction of between two to four large refineries to process their output.
The capital costs and risks of such a venture would deter all but the largest companies.
The solution to this scale mismatch was the formation of joint ventures of several
companies to develop the mines and take bauxite in proportion to their ownership to feed
their own refineries needs, still a form of vertical integration. This form of organization
ensured an outlet for the bauxite, and an assured supply of bauxite for the refineries
enabling the joint venture partners to share the costs and risks of development. 50 It did not,
however, avoid the problem of bilateral monopoly. Long term contracts were still
necessary because mines ownership does not necessarily correspond to output shares by
the partners, 51 potential conflict over contractual prices, or the destination of the bauxite;
and host governments were concerned about the establishment of "fair" bauxite prices for
taxation purposes.
Arguments for vertical integration recognize the strong mutual dependence between
mines and refiners, and the extreme difficulty of setting bauxite prices. Long-term bauxite
48 John A. Stuckey, Vertical Integration and Joint Ventures in the Aluminum Industry,
(Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press), 1983.
49 Shearson-Lehman-Hutton, Annual Review of the World Aluminum Industry, (1989), pp.
41-48.
50 Ibid
51 John A. Stuckey, Vertical Integration and Joint Ventures in the Aluminum Industry.,
(Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press), 1983.
49
contracts are a second-best solution. For example, Japan used to be a major purchaser of
traded bauxites from the Pacific Rim, from Weipa and Gove, Bintan and Malaysia. The
collapse of Japanese refining has left the mines at minimal operation,5 2 and due to the
impact of freight costs, it is difficult for these bauxites to compete in North America or
Europe.
Because of the superiority of vertical integration between mines and refineries, most
of the probable refinery expansions in the medium term are expected to be governed by a
vertical structure. The traded bauxite market is likely to shrink. For example, a major
buyer, CVG-AL, is building its own mine. CVRD, a major seller, is building its own
refinery. Expansion of Australian refineries are also probable. The problems of mutual
dependence are not all producer-oriented; the remaining bauxite buyers in Europe and
North America must face the problem of their increasing dependence on a few sources of
bauxite, mainly Boke in Guinea, in a declining bauxite market.
Vertical integration is therefore the best form of organization between mines and
refineries, and may be inevitable in cases where freight costs reduce the possibility of
exporting bauxite, such as in Western Australia. If there is no vertical integration, the
strength of mutual dependence is such that transactions will almost always be governed by
long-term contracts. These are the second-best solutions for bauxite transactions because of
the scale mismatch between modem mines and refineries. Joint venture arrangements were
a response to this mismatch, but the problems of enforcing long-term contracts have forced
companies to internalize bauxite transactions. As a result, most refinery expansions and
new refineries likely will be part of a vertically integrated system. 53
52 CVG-Planificacion Corporativa data base.
53 Ibid.
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3.2. Should Primary and Alumina Operations be Fully Integrated?
It is assumed that the firm is already integrated, and any change to its current state,
even if desirable, will happen slowly.54 One reason why structural changes might not be
necessary is that alumina operations are competitive in their own right. If integration
resulted from undertaking profitable alumina investments per se, in principle there would
be no need to change. However, if changes are required, they will be slowed down by the
high barriers to exit from the alumina industry.
The Integrated Majors' existing pattern of integration across the alumina market was
not accidental, but resulted from a necessity to integrate backward because alumina markets
did not exist. A characteristic for the Majors is their long alumina position, as a group they
run a substantial alumina surplus. Therefore, they all produce enough alumina to supply
their integrated smelting operations, plus a surplus to cover most of the Independent
Smelters and Second-Tier Producers alumina deficit.55
The Miner/Refiners group is long in alumina, although its capacity did not grow in
the same proportion as that of Independent Smelters. This is mainly because of the large
minimum efficient scale required for greenfield alumina refineries, the need for access to
low-cost bauxite sources, and the high risks associated with alumina investment. Thus, the
Majors' alumina position is the one that complements the Independent Smelters' short
position.
CVG-AL, classified as Independent Smelter mainly in response to historical
developments, currently falls between the Miners/Refiners and the Independent Smelters.
Its long alumina position and clear competitive advantage in energy locate CVG-AL in a
contradictory situation at this point. Its access to cheap energy resources should provide
incentive to CVG-AL to concentrate its investment plans in primary aluminum production
54 John A. Stuckey, Vertical Integration and Joint Ventures in the Aluminum Industry.,
(Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press), 1983.
55 Colin Pratt, "Is Vertical Integration in Aluminum Really Necessary?", Prepared for:
Metals Week's Second Aluminum Symposium, 1989, pp. 4.
and run a short alumina position.56 Currently, CVG-AL's operating costs in alumina are
above average, while its primary aluminum production costs are among the lowest in the
industry. 57 Although it is expected that CVG-AL alumina operating costs will be reduced
as the Los Pijiguaos mines start producing efficiently, is it necessary to be fully integrated
across its alumina operations?
As discussed previously, there is a growing alumina free-market, and the risk of
supply shortage should decline due to the increasing size of the market and the number of
buyers and sellers. Moreover, there is still high alumina price volatility and time lags
between alumina and primary aluminum prices, thus alumina to primary aluminum
relationship tends to be even more volatile. However, these sources of risk should be well
managed by a low cost smelter. If a long alumina position is fully justified on cost
grounds, revenues from increasing alumina capacity should be compared with potential
revenues from increasing primary aluminum capacity because, in general, alumina revenues
account for only a small proportion of total revenues.
Another consideration is that once an alumina investment is undertaken, exit from
ongoing operations will not be easy due to high fixed costs, backward ties to bauxite either
through mine ownership or long-term bauxite contracts, and especially, in the case of a
state-owned enterprise, the social and political implications. Given these facts, exit from
alumina operations only occurs in extreme conditions. In addition, because increases in
alumina capacity are required to be large scale, any potential firm entering the industry, or
any existing firm considering expanding its current capacity, must evaluate the impact of its
own move on the prices of alumina.
Therefore, a fully vertical integrated organization between alumina and primary
aluminum operations might not be the optimal decision. If there is no balance between
alumina and primary operations, and the firm has clear cost advantages in its primary
56 This is assuming the development of the alumina free-market.
57 Venalum C.A. data base.
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aluminum operations, then the possible risks associated with running a short alumina
position can be managed by structuring an efficient portfolio of contracts. Even if the firm's
alumina expansion can be justified on cost grounds, access to low energy sources would
force the firm to concentrate its expansion plans in the smelting stage.
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Chapter 4
Cost Structure Analysis
This chapter analyzes the cost structure for the alumina industry and provides a base
case estimate for a greenfield alumina refinery with the capacity of one million tons per
year. This estimate is to be used as a base case for the valuation model presented in Chapter
6. It is based on cost data from the United States Bureau of Mines, and adjusted by data
provided by Venalum C.A. The analysis is divided into three sections: capital costs, where
the discussion is focussed on analyzing the capital outlays required for greenfield projects;
operating costs which present an average operating cost scenario; and finally, the main
operating cost: bauxite, caustic soda, labor and energy are studied on a company and a
regional basis.
4.1. Capital Costs.
A capital cost estimate of $800 per ton of alumina is detailed in Table 9.58 It is
expected to be an average estimate of the actual cost for a greenfield project with a capacity
of one million tons per year of alumina. Although the actual costs for a specific project will
vary from this estimate, it serves as a base case for analyzing capital investments in the
alumina industry. The actual cost of a refinery will vary depending on the infrastructure
needs and the rated capacity on the equipment.
Equipment costs for the process are based on cost-capacity data and manufacturer's
costs quotations. To cover minor construction costs and equipment not listed explicitly, a
10% contingency is added in each section. The field indirect costs for each section are
58 Deborah Kramer and Frank A. Peters, Cost Estimate of the Bayer Process for Producin2
Alumina. based on 1982 equipment prices. (Bureau of Mines-Department of Interior, IC-
8958, 1983). The estimate is updated using information from Venalum C.A.
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estimated as 10% of the direct cost.59 Included under plant facilities, estimated at 8% of
fixed capital costs, are the costs of material and labor for auxiliary buildings and the cost of
non-process equipment. Also included are labor and material costs for site preparation.
Plant utilities, including the cost of water, power, and steam are estimated at 10% of fixed
capital costs.
Table 9. Capital Costs Estimate, 1989.
($'000)
Fixed Capital:
Bauxite Handling and slurry preparation section 34,856
Digestion section 94,132
Clarification section 73,564
Precipitation and decomposition section 112,475
Caustic regeneration section 241,545
Steamplant 30,730
Sub-Total 587,302
Plant facilities, 8% of above sub-total 46,984
Plant utilities, 10% of above sub-total 58,730
Total plant cost 693,016
Land cost 0
Sub-total 693,016
Interest during construction period 50,990
Total fixed capital cost 744,006
Working Capital:
Raw materials and supplies 12,000
Product and in-process inventory 23,550
Accounts receivables 18,500
Desired cash 5,000
Working capital cost 59,050
Capitalized start-up costs 8,200
Sub-total 67,250
Total capital costs 811,256
Source: Deborah Kramer, Cost Estimate of the Bayer Process for Producing
Alumina. based on 1982 equipment prices, (IC-8958, Department of
Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1983): 6. The estimate is updated using
information from Venalum C.A.
59 This estimate includes field supervision, inspection, temporary construction, and
equipment rentals.
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The cost of interest on capital borrowed for construction is included as interest
during construction. A 70% debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the construction period and
10% cost of debt, with no debt repayment during construction, are assumed.60 Interests
during construction are calculated as follows: interest for half of the new loan amount every
year, plus full amount of previous outstanding debt. Land costs and port facilities are not
included in this estimate. Working capital is estimated as follows: raw materials and
supplies inventory for two months of operation, typical in the alumina industry , product
and in-process inventory, accounts receivable assuming 30 days receivables, 6 1 and
required cash. One percent of the fixed capital is estimated for capitalized start-up costs.
In greenfield projects, capital costs will vary considerably, depending upon the
different infrastructure requirements, location, size and availability of local labor and
materials. Although difficult to generalize, total capital costs for new refineries are currently
in the range of $700 to $1,200 per ton of alumina installed capacity.62
The annual debt-servicing costs associated with such projects will vary according to
the size of the initial investment, construction period, and the financial arrangements
employed: debt to equity ratio, cost of debt, loan repayment period, assumed project cost of
capital, and a variety of tax considerations. Table 10 shows the annual debt service for
projects with different fixed capital costs, assuming a 10% cost of debt, and repayment
periods of 10, 15 and 20 years. A constant debt to equity ratio of 70% is assumed and the
debt repayment is calculated as an annuity. Even though this is not precise, it will give a
sense of the debt service for alumina projects.63
60 A 70% debt-to equity ratio is high if compared to aluminum companies' ratio at an
average of 20-30%; however, it is usually the case on this type of investment to have such
a high debt due to its high interest coverage ratio over the life of the project.
61 Days receivables is defined as accounts receivables over sales per day.
62 Frank X. McCawley, and Luke H. Baumgardner, Aluminum, Bureau of Mines, Preprint
from Bulletin 675, Mineral Facts and Problems, 1985 Edition.
63 Investment cost is defined as the sum of fixed capital costs, interest during
construction, and working capital needs at the end of the construction period.
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Table 10 indicates that even in the case of low-cost projects depreciated over 20
years, capital charges could amount to $50 per ton of output. It also shows that for projects
exceeding $1,000 per ton of capacity, annual debt service is around or in excess of $100
per ton depending on the amortization period. This example illustrates the high impact debt
service payments could have on the project's cash flows. Operating costs will be analyzed
in the next section.
Table 10. Annual Debt Service Estimates ($ millions).
Repayment Period (Years)
Total Investment Debt Portion 10 15 20
600 420 68.35 55.22 49.33
800 560 91.14 73.63 65.78
1,000 700 113.92 92.03 82.22
1,200 840 136.71 110.44 98.67
4.2. Operating Costs.
Table 11 provides an estimate for raw material requirements per ton of alumina
using bauxite from the "Los Pijiguaos" mine in Venezuela. 64 Table 12 provides an estimate
for average operating costs per year. Both tables are based on Interalumina C.A.'s financial
operating costs. 65
The operating costs are divided into direct and indirect costs. Direct costs include
raw materials, utilities, direct labor, plant maintenance, and operating supplies. The raw
material costs, except for bauxite, are fob prices. Electricity, water and gas utilities are
based on market prices.
64 Venalum C.A. data base.
65 In this case, the difference between financial and economic costs is not significant
given that bauxite, caustic soda, replacement materials, and energy are quoted at market
prices. Also, the sum of these costs accounts for more than 85% of total operating costs.
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Table 11. Raw Materials Requirements per ton of alumina.
Bauxite66  2.340 ton
Caustic Soda (100%)67 0.140 ton
Limestone 0.010 ton
Starch 0.007 ton
Water 3.500 m3
Electricity 230.000 Kwh
Natural Gas 222.000 NM3
Source: Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum C.A.
Table 12. Operating Costs Estimate, 1989.
Direct Costs:
Raw Materials:
Bauxite at $34.6 per ton
Caustic Soda at $210 per ton
Limestone at $1.65 per ton
Starch at $170 per ton
Others
Sub-total
Utilities:
Electricity at $0.015 per Kwh
Natural Gas at $0.038 per NM3
Industrial Water at $0.05 per m3
Sub-total
Direct Labor at $8.40 per hour
Plant Maintenance
Operating Supplies (10% of plant maintenance)
Indirect costs (40% of labor and maintenance)
Sub-total
Total Operating Costs
Source: Deborah Kramer, Cost Estimate of the
Alumina, based on 1982 equipment prices,
Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1983): 8.68 The
information from Venalum C.A.
Annual Cost
($'000)
80,960
29,600
1,330
760
300
112,610
Cost per ton($)
80.96
29.26
1.33
0.76
0.30
112.61
3,450 3.45
8,440 8.44
500 0.05
11,940 11.94
9,700 9.70
7,250 7.25
730 0.73
6,780 6.78
24,460 24.46
149,010 149.01
Bayer Process for Producing
(IC-8958, Department of
estimate is adjusted using
Plant maintenance is estimated separately considering: maintenance labor,
maintenance materials, inventory adjustments, rental equipment, and other maintenance
66 Considering bauxite from the Los Pijiguaos mine in Venezuela.
67 It is obtained in liquid form (50%). One ton of Caustic Soda (100%) requires 2.58 tons
of Caustic Soda (50%). From Interalumina C.A. data base.
68 Fixed Costs were excluded from the table provided by the source.
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services. The cost of operating supplies is estimated as 10% of the cost of plant
maintenance. Indirect costs are estimated to be 40% of the direct labor costs, plus
maintenance costs. Indirect costs include expenses for control laboratories, accounting,
plant protection and safety, plant administration, marketing, and company overhead.
Research and overall company administrative costs outside the plant are excluded here.
The estimated annual operating cost for the base case is about $150 million or $150
per ton of alumina. This estimate is very sensitive to changes in the cost of bauxite, caustic
soda, labor and energy. Special infrastructure requirements which depend on the individual
plant site, have not been considered in this estimate. To estimate the significance of
infrastructure cost, each project must be considered individually; thus making an estimate
would be very misleading. In order to understand the factors affecting the main operating
costs bauxite, caustic soda, labor and energy are each discussed separately in the next
section.
4.3. Major Operating Costs.
The objective of this section is to present a comparative analysis of major alumina
operating costs: bauxite, caustic soda, labor and energy, and determine the sources of
competitive advantage that CVG-Aluminum might have in producing alumina. This
analysis presents a cost distribution by companies and regions.69
4.3.1. Distribution by Major Companies.
Comparing CVG with other major alumina producers as shown in Figure 12, CVG
currently has an average position. This is largely because of high bauxite cost. 70 It
represents more than 50% of CVG's operating costs, and reflects the dependence on
69 The regional division is based on that used by the International Primary Aluminum
Institute [IPAI].
70 Interalumina C.A. had contracts for 1989 at $34.6 per ton of bauxite. This represents,
on average, $76.8 per ton of alumina.
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Figure 12. Average Operating Costs by Company,1989 (Current $).
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expensive imported bauxite, primarily from Trombetas, Brazil. CVG bauxite costs are
expected to decline in the short term as the "Los Pijiguaos" mine comes fully on stream.
Costs are expected to be at about $25 per ton cif considerably improving CVG's position.
This cost is on the optimistic side. High investment costs and time delays already
incurred by the mine might force prices to be increased. Also, this expected price assumes
an efficient transportation system along the Orinoco River which, has yet to be solved. So,
if the bauxite cost to be used in the valuation should reflect real opportunity costs and not a
subsidized transfer pricing policy, we would expect that the bauxite costs would be
approximately $30 per ton of bauxite, or $67.2 per ton of alumina, assuming that 2.34 tons
of bauxite are required per ton of alumina. If the latter is true, CVG's position would still
be that of an average alumina producer with no real competitive advantage in increasing its
capacity.
Other important points are notable from Figure 12: The low operating costs of
Alcoa of Australia and Alusuisse would make these companies the most likely to increase
their alumina refinery capacities, given the possibility they have to expand their ongoing
refineries. In addition, Alusuisse has the best technology for alumina operations. Pechiney
and Alcan have the highest operating costs in the industry. As the free market continues to
expand, we would expect Alcan and Pechiney to rely more on the arm-length market. This
situation may open new opportunities for existing low-cost producers or for new entrants.
4.3.2. Distribution by Regions.
The following sections consider each of the major operating costs and describe the
average cost by region. It presents the average cost in 1988 and 1989 in current U.S.
dollars, and a personal estimate of what the trend might be in the short term. A consolidated
view of the major operating costs is shown in Figure 18.
4.3.2.1. Bauxite Costs.
Trends in bauxite capacity and markets can be viewed as evolutionary rather than
subject to the cyclical swings which have characterized primary aluminum, and more
specifically alumina. Since 1960, bauxite production has steadily shifted from industrial
countries to less developed countries, except for the case of Australia, whose output is
mostly refined into alumina.71
The pattern of bauxite production is not expected to change through the 1990's. It
will continue shifting from industrial countries to less developed ones. Guinea and Jamaica
should remain as major producers, and growth in output is expected in Brazil and
Venezuela to cover their domestic primary aluminum production fully.72
In analyzing bauxite prices it is important to differentiate between refineries which
form part of an integrated mining operation, and those which rely on imported bauxite. At
many integrated mines bauxite prices depend upon the adopted internal transfer pricing
policy. For those bauxites traded on a free market, such as in Western Australia, India and
Brazil, bauxite is priced on the basis of the prevailing market prices.
Bauxite prices vary considerably, from as low as $6 per ton at integrated mines to
as high as $35 per ton for Boke material. To a large extent, this wide spread in prices
reflects quality differences between the various bauxites. Proximity to the consuming
refinery also affects freight rate differentials and therefore ultimately has an impact on
prices. Government-imposed levies or export taxes are other factors to be considered when
comparing different bauxite prices.73
To compare different bauxite types, it is necessary to consider prices in terms of the
recoverable alumina content of each material. Indeed, bauxites with similar fob or cif prices
could be valued entirely differently by refineries due to wide variations in the alumina
7 1 The World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities. 1988-2000,
(Washington D.C., The World Bank, 1989).
72 Ibid.
73 Venalum C.A. data base.
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content of each bauxite. It is therefore important to obtain a standardized bauxite price
which takes account of the available alumina content of the ore. The amount of bauxite
required per ton of alumina varies, depending on the sourcing mine, ranging from 1.95
tons to almost 3.5 tons of bauxite per ton of alumina.
Figure 13 shows the prices of imported bauxite into the United States relative to
imported alumina contract prices. Here we can see a close correlation between bauxite and
alumina prices. However, when compared to aluminum prices, there are clear time lags
between alumina and primary aluminum prices created by the adjustment time required by
the alumina and bauxite contracts. Indeed, both markets are mainly contractual markets
with few spot transactions.74
Figure 14 shows weighted average bauxite costs in U.S. dollars per ton of alumina
for 1988-1989, and a medium term, speculative tendency. This accounts for refineries'
bauxite arrangements, specifications and prices cif.75 As the figure shows, Oceania has the
lowest bauxite cost by a considerable margin, primarily as a result of low operating costs
and integrated mining operations. Also, Australian refineries are closer to their bauxite
source of supply, excluding the case of QAL. 76 Of all the Australian refineries, Gove
enjoyed the lowest bauxite cost at around $14 per ton of alumina in 1989. The QAL
refinery had the highest bauxite cost of any refinery in the region, over $45 per ton of
alumina in 1989. This was due mainly to the transfer policy of Weipa bauxite to the
refinery at a market price rather than on a cost basis.77 The plant also incurred considerable
freight charges on the long distance from the mine to the refinery. In future years average
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Queensland Alumina Limited, Australia.
77 Venalum C.A. data base.
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Figure 13. Prices of Alumina and Bauxite imported into US (Current $).
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bauxite costs in Australia are set to decline in real terms, largely as a result of the Australian
Dollar falling in value with respect to the U.S. Dollar.78
Figure 14. Average Bauxite Costs by Region (Current $).
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Asia ranks second among regions in terms of low bauxite costs, a ranking which
reflects the close relationship of adjacent mines-refineries in the area. Indeed, all India's
alumina capacity is fed by local bauxites. 79 Over the next few years, the price is expected
to remain constant in real terms in the region.80
Despite access to large local supplies, Latin American refineries must pay
comparatively high bauxite prices due to high transportation costs, especially in Brazil and
78 The World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities. 1988-2000,
(Washington D.C., The World Bank, 1989).
79 Venalum C.A. data base.
80 The World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities. 1988-2000,
(Washington D.C., The World Bank, 1989).
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Venezuela, and the impact of the Jamaican bauxite levy. Another factor putting upward
pressure on average prices has been the poor operating performance of the Los Pijiguaos
mine in Venezuela. A series of delays from Los Pijiguaos have forced CVG to depend
greatly on imported bauxite at a cost of approximately $80 per ton of alumina. However,
expected improvement in Los Pijiguaos's operations, a projected fall in Trombetas bauxite
price, and a decline on the Jamaican bauxite levy should ultimately result in a lower average
bauxite price for the region.
Bauxite costs are far higher in Europe due to the fact that most of the bauxite
consumed is imported at market prices, plus the cost of transportation from the producing
region. Indeed, European producers with local supplies had bauxite costs well below
average in 1989. European bauxite costs rose in 1989 when Guinean [Boke] bauxite prices
increased. Boke bauxite accounts for most of the bauxite consumed in Europe. But this
high bauxite cost is likely to decline after 1989 as a result of declining prices in alumina and
primary aluminum markets. 81
Bauxite costs in North America are currently the highest in the world, because of
the unavailability of local bauxite supplies. North American refineries must thus depend
fully on expensive, traded bauxites, which as noted earlier have high transportation costs.
U.S. bauxite costs will tend to remain constant over the next few years.
4.3.2.2. Caustic Soda Costs.
Caustic soda costs come from two sources, chemical losses and physical losses. In
1989, chemical losses varied from as low as 17 kg per ton of alumina in refineries running
solely bauxite from the Boke mine, to as high as 128 kg per ton on refineries running high-
reactive-silica-content bauxites. Physical losses can range from as low as 20 kg per ton to
66
81 Ibid.
as high as 50 kg per ton of alumina. Thus, total caustic soda losses can vary from a low of
37 kg per ton to a high of 148 kg per ton of alumina.
Between 1986-1989 caustic soda prices increased, and they are expected to
continue increasing, largely as a result of a tight chlorine market. From the refineries'
perspective, costs of caustic soda represent, approximately 20% of full operating cost, the
third highest cost behind bauxite (37%), and energy (25%).
Figure 15 shows the distribution of caustic soda costs per region in U.S. dollars
per ton of alumina. North American caustic soda costs average the lowest in the world and
are expected to remain low throughout the next several years, a reflection of North
American access to low soda prices and the consumption of high-cost, low-reactive-silica
bauxites.
Source: Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum CA.
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Caustic soda costs are relatively low in Europe for similar reasons. The high
amount of Boke bauxite consumed in European refineries should help to ensure that caustic
soda costs remain at their 1989 level for the next several years. However, those refineries
consuming European bauxites will continue to have high caustic soda costs.
In Latin America, the cost of caustic soda has not risen as steeply as elsewhere in
recent years, mainly because Brazilian caustic soda prices were already at extremely high
levels prior to 1986.82 Over the next few years, Latin America caustic soda costs are
expected to remain close to today's level. However, because of high reliance on the spot
market, the region may still be vulnerable to the high short-term volatility of the market.
Costs are much higher in Oceania due to the proportionately greater reactive silica
content of Australian bauxites. In the last two years the cost of caustic soda has risen by
more than 200%.83 This sharp rise in caustic soda prices has reduced the operating costs
gap between Australian and the rest of world refineries.
Due to the exceptionally high level of domestic prices in India, Asia experiences the
highest caustic soda costs. Although some decline is expected in real terms for the future, it
is expected that Asia will continue to maintain the highest costs in the industry.
4.3.2.3. Labor Costs.
On average, labor costs account for approximately 15% of total direct operating
costs, and varies considerably depending on different regional labor productivity ratios and
employment costs. Figure 16 shows labor cost distribution in U.S. dollars per ton of
alumina.
Labor costs in North America and Europe are considerably higher than those in
other regions as a result of higher minimum wages. Indian labor costs are the lowest,
despite poor productivity, because of extremely low employment costs and a depreciated
68
82 Venalum C.A. data base.
83 Ibid.
currency. In general, the higher average productivity of North American and European
refineries is insufficient compensation for the lower wages of the less developed countries.
An exception is Australia, where productivity is high and labor cost half way between
developed and developing countries84 . By 1995, Oceania and Latin America are expected
to increase their labor-competitive advantage due to major brownfield expansions and
currency depreciation against the dollar.
Figure 16. Average Labor Costs by Region (Current $).
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4.3.2.4. Energy Costs.
Energy costs represent 20-25% of total operating costs. Of all operating costs,
energy costs have decreased the most due to technological improvements in alumina
69
84 Ibid.
refining.85 Refineries differ markedly, however, in terms of energy efficiency and fuel
costs. CVG's refinery is one of the lowest energy cost refineries in the world, with energy
costs at about 8% of total operating costs. Indian refineries have the highest energy costs,
accounting for almost 50% of total direct production costs. These illustrate the wide
variations between energy costs when considering refineries' relative cost position.
Figure 17 shows average energy cost distribution by region on U.S. dollars per ton
of alumina86. North America has the lowest energy costs in the industry. Relatively low,
energy-consumption technology and more importantly, access to cheap gas supplies,
provide North America with a clear competitive advantage over other regions. This
advantage is expected to remain, though it is likely to diminish as the other low-energy cost
regions, Australia and Latin America, begin to close the gap, as a result of U.S. dollar
appreciation.
Latin America has relatively low energy costs, estimated at about $26 per ton of
alumina in 1989. However, the region's average cost is significantly affected by the low
energy costs incurred at CVG's refinery. This efficient refinery has extremely inexpensive
gas supplies, with energy costs at about $12 per ton of alumina. Most other refineries in the
region are dependent on expensive heavy fuel oil.
Costs in Oceania are relatively low, at about $32 per ton on average in 1989, due in
part to the region's accessibility to local gas supplies. A decline is expected in the future
due to the U.S. dollar appreciation.
Due to higher average fuel oil prices, energy costs in Europe are relatively high
compared to other regions. In 1989, the average was about $45 per ton. It is expected that
high energy costs will remain in the region unless new, cost-effective technological
improvements increase refineries' efficiency.
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85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
Asia's costs are the least cost-competitive, at an average of $63 per ton due to high
fuel prices and high energy consuming refineries. Although Asia's costs are expected to fall
as a result of the installation of new energy-efficient technology and a depreciating
exchange rate in India, it will have very little effect on Asia's position as the highest energy
cost region.
Figure 17. Average Energy Costs by Region (Current $).
70 $/ton Alumina
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Oceania Europe Latin CVG North Asia
America America
* 1988 M 1989 * 1995
Source: Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum CA.
4.3.2.5. Consolidated Distribution by Regions.
Figure 18 shows the 1989 consolidated cost structure by region, including major
operating costs, expressed in U.S. dollars per ton of alumina. It is important to note the
variability of bauxite and energy costs, which both account for more than 60% of the total
in all regions. The foregoing facts show that the sources of competitive advantage in
alumina production stem from access to low-cost energy and bauxite.
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Figure 18. Consolidated Cost Distribution by Regions, 1989.
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Finally, even though CVG has access to low cost labor and energy resources, its
extremely high bauxite costs place the company above the Latin American average. This
clearly shows the necessity for improving production at the Los Pijiguaos mine as the only
viable alternative for reducing bauxite costs. Otherwise, the refinery requirements would
have to continue being covered by actual suppliers due to the dependence between mines
and refineries. Given the imperfections of the bauxite market and its tendency to shrink,
imported bauxite would be expensive and difficult to find.87
This brings us to the issue of what the CVG strategy should be, and to what extent
an alumina expansion should be considered at this point, given the many uncertainties
associated with the domestic bauxite production.
87 The World Bank, Price Prospects for MaJor Primary Commodities. 1988-2000,
(Washington D.C., The World Bank, 1989).
73
Chapter 5
Organization of the Alumina Industry
This chapter examines the underlying structure of the alumina market and its
behavior, analyzes factors that affect alumina prices, and evaluates the impact of expanding
capacity in the industry. Two models: perfect competition and oligopoly are analyzed to
shed light on what is the underlying organization of the industry, and how this organization
might affect prices. The supply and demand curves derived for this purpose represent a
first approximation. The methodology used does not consider any dynamic interaction over
time. To include any dynamic relationship, sophisticated econometrics and forecasting
methods are required, which are beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, this rather
simplified approximation is very helpful in understanding alumina pricing.
5.1. Past Trends in Contract and Spot Prices.
Figure 19 shows the pattern of alumina spot and contract prices since 1976. The
prices shown are average values, except for Norway cif import prices. This figure refers to
estimated medium term, two-to-five-year contracts negotiated on an fob basis. Norway cif
prices are shown because its alumina requirements are fully covered by arm-length
transactions. Norway cif prices give a good approximation of the market response to
changes in industry conditions.
In contrast to the primary market, there is no recognized reference cycle for the
alumina free-market. At any particular period there is a wide range of contract prices which
vary according to different factors, such as duration of the contract, relative location of the
supplier, quantity contracted, and the relationship between the parties concerned.
Furthermore, there is significant variations in individual contract prices, not only between
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those quoted by different alumina producers, but also between prices quoted by the same
alumina producer. 88
Source: Industria Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum C.A.
Despite these qualifications, Figure 19 clearly shows a dramatic decline in alumina
contract prices since the early 1980's. After rising to nearly $245 per ton in 1980, average
fob, medium term contract prices subsequently fell to around $130-145 per ton in 1986-
1987 respectively, representing a 40% reduction in six years. This was followed by an
unexpectedly large increase in average alumina prices in the last two years when spot prices
rose, on average, to above $500 per ton at the peak in 1989, and contract prices rose to
$260 per ton of alumina fob. This was mainly caused by a tight alumina balance as result of
an increased demand for primary aluminum. 89 After a steady increase in prices from 1976
88 Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum C.A.
89 Ibid.
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Figure 19. FOB Contract and Spot Alumina Prices ($/ton).
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to 1981, the decline in real prices was even more pronounced, as is evident from Figure
20. Indeed, in real terms the average delivered price fell by almost 60% between 1981 and
1987.
Of special interest is the relationship between recent movements in free-market
alumina prices relative to the LME three-month price index. 90 Alumina-to-primary-
aluminum exchange ratios are essentially the inverse of prices expressed in terms of some
percentage of primary prices. Usually, the ratio specified in the contract will depend upon a
variety of arrangements, current primary aluminum prices, and in particular, whether the
alumina and metal price are determined on a cif or an fob basis.91
Figure 20. Trends in Real Alumina Prices (1989$).
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90 LME: London Metal Exchange Index. It varies depending on the duration, e.g., cash,
three-month, etc.
91 Interview with Mr. Antonio Azpurua. Venalum-International Officer.
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It is apparent in Figure 21, that apart from 1980-1982 and 1988-1989, when
alumina prices moved far out of line with primary aluminum prices, the alumina to primary
prices tended to fluctuate within 0.085 to 0.12. Finally, after rapid revival of primary prices
in 1987, the ratio increased suddenly during 1988 and 1989. In these two years, the spot
alumina to LME-three-month primary aluminum price ratio reflected the unexpected
increase in aluminum demand. Primary prices were above normal levels at approximately
1 10g/lb in 1988 and 900/lb in 1989.
5.2. Structural Changes and their Influence on Pricing Policies.
The alumina market has undergone considerable changes over the past decade.
During the 1970's the industry was characterized by high levels of refinery utilization, well
in excess of 80% throughout most of the period, strong demand growth, and a high degree
of vertical integration. 92 Also, Alcoa of Australia has been, by far, the largest supplier of
the alumina free-market. 93 Under these conditions, long term, cost-based, contracts were
commonplace and comparatively little business was conducted on a short term, 1-to-3 year
contracts or spot basis. Uncertainty about possible shortage of raw materials in the 1980's
only served to reinforce the need for securing long term supply agreements.94
By the early 1980's the basic structure of the alumina market began to change
dramatically, and was accompanied by a radical shift in pricing policies. Several factors
were responsible for these changes: overcapacity began to emerge in the 1980's, initially
the result of a sharp slow down in alumina demand during 1981 and 1982, and later
exacerbated by the introduction of new refining capacity in Australia, Latin America and
92 Shearson-Lehman-Hutton, Annual Review of the World Aluminum, (1989), pp.4 1-4 8.
93 George D. Smith, From Monopoly to Competition: the Transformation of Alcoa. 1888-
1986, (Cambridge University Press, 1988).
94 Robin Adams, "Economic Cost Analysis of the Aluminum Industry", as part of "The
Metal Bulletin's Fifth International Aluminum Conference," Caracas, Venezuela, 1988.
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Figure 21. Alumina Price to LME-3 months Price.
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Ireland.95 Over capacity in the alumina market, along with decreased demand for primary
aluminum demand and weak prices, forced independent smelters to impose considerable
pressure on alumina producers to renegotiate their supply arrangements. Consequently,
contract-time lengths became shorter, particularly for new contracts.
Although long-term supply agreements still persisted, the period between price
negotiations was often reduced significantly to avoid prices moving too far off line from the
free-market, and contract terms were renegotiated with traditional cost-based clauses,
including escalation terms based, partially or fully, on primary prices. 96 As a result, the
negotiating power balance clearly shifted towards free-market alumina buyers. The
emergence of additional free-market alumina sellers undoubtedly contributed to these
changes.
By getting assurances for their minimum quantity under existing long-term
contracts, many smelters were able to take advantage of this growing availability of free-
market alumina by increasing their spot purchases. This helped to maintain the demand
pressure on prices during the mid-1980's. More importantly perhaps, integrated transfer
prices and production policies began to reflect the extreme weakness of the alumina free-
market. The traditional cost based approach to transfer pricing policy tended to be replaced
by pricing policies which closely reflected free-market prices.
The increasing size of the alumina free market over the past decade has shifted the
alumina market to a "quasi-commodity" market behavior. 97 However, the market cannot
be considered perfectly competitive, due to the existence of market rigidities and high
concentration levels in the industry, and the maintenance of high cost refineries by major
companies such as Pechiney. These facts reflect not only the importance of optimal
economic decisions, but also the importance of strategic and institutional considerations.
9 5 Venalum C.A. data base.
96 Ibid.
97 A 'quasi-commodity" market exists when prices are expected to be ultimately governed
by competitive forces
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Technical factors also affect the speed of supply response since capacity changes
are often made in large steps to achieve minimum efficient scale. Moreover, few producers
continue to dominate the free-market and long term contracts still exist. 98 Quality
considerations, as well, can affect supply relationships although, with greater
standardization in alumina specifications, this barrier to free-market transactions has tended
to disappear.
In order to understand the structure that might prevail in the industry, it is important
to analyze the behavior of the free market. In the next section the models of a perfectly
competitive market and of an oligopolistic market are considered to explain the behavior of
the alumina market. The latter is studied, assuming the existence of a dominant firm.
5.3. The Alumina Free Market Behavior.
The aim of this section is to analyze the models of perfect competition and oligopoly
as possible explanations to the underlying alumina free-market organization. We will also
study other factors affecting prices, such as regional imbalances, primary aluminum prices,
and primary aluminum-alumina ratios.
5.3.1. The Free-Market Supply and Demand Curves.
Before studying either of the two models, it is necessary to define alumina free-
market supply and demand. 99 It can be argued that, in the short term, integrated producers
will often continue to operate their refineries simply in order to supply the alumina
requirements to their own smelting system. Production decisions made by these companies
will be influenced not only by commercial considerations, but also by strategic and
98 Mike Edwards, "Structural Change in the Alumina Market", Metals Week Aluminum
Symposium, 1988.
99 The free market is analyzed in order to have a good approximation of the market price.
The objective is to avoid considering any distortions which might have been created by
internal transfer pricing policies.
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institutional factors. Consequently, some integrated refineries may continue to operate in
the short term even though they are failing to cover their operating costs at prevailing
market prices.
Figure 22 depicts the derived free-market supply curves for 1987, 1988 and 1989.
The supply curve has shifted upwards because of changes in current operating costs due to
inflation. Shifts to the right represent increasing available capacity to the free market. It is
important to note that new capacity has always been on the flat part of the curve, which has
increased the elastic portion of the supply curve.
Source: Venozolana de Aluminio, Venalum C.A.
Supply schedules have been derived by examining available output for non-
integrated transactions. 100 A certain degree of approximation is necessary to plot such
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100 Venalum C.A. data base.
curves to avoid taking into account integrated supply arrangements which, for the purpose
of evaluating potential free-market supplies, should be excluded. The free-market capacity
available in 1987 was about 8.6 million tons just over 9 million tons per year in 1988, and
about 10.2 million tons per year in 1989.
Figure 23 shows the derived demands for hypothetical primary aluminum prices of
700/lb, 800/lb, 900/lb and 1100/lb using 1989 smelters' operating costs. 10 1 The free-
market demand is represented by a curve which plots smelters' willingness to pay, given
their operating costs, excluding alumina for a given primary price.
_Ww WJNW W WW WWW ('000
-D(70/lb) - D(80/lb) -D(900/lb) -D(1100/lb) s/y 1
Source: Venezolana de Aluminio, Venalum C.A.
The derived demand curves define the quantity required by non-integrated smelters
at different alumina prices. In cases where smelters obtained alumina from both integrated
82
Figure 23. Derived Demand Using 1989 Operating Costs.
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refineries and the free market, only free-market supplies are included. 102 The ability to pay
for alumina was then derived by subtracting operating cost estimates for a given aluminum
price and deducting an alumina freight cost to obtain an fob measure of smelters'
willingness to pay 10 3. Total aluminum capacity dependent on the free alumina market
accounted for about 5.2 million tons in 1989. The major buyers of free-market alumina are
producers in the Middle East, Hydro Aluminum in Norway, Alumax and the newly formed
independent smelters in the United States [U.S.]. Others include Aluar in Argentina, Albras
in Brazil, Asahan in Indonesia, and Delfzijl in Holland. 104
5.3.2. Perfectly Competitive Pricing Model.
In perfect competition, producers are price takers and price is determined where the
industry's marginal cost equals the industry's marginal revenue. Consequently, on the
basis of this rather simple model, price movements can be caused by shifts in either the
supply or the demand curve. 105 Certainly the pronounced downward shift in costs during
the 1980's helps to at least partly explain the fall in prices which occurred over this
period. 106 Indeed, between 1982 and 1987 full production costs at the marginal alumina
supplier fell by some $60 per ton in nominal terms, while contract alumina prices declined
by $40 to $50 per ton on average. 107
In a highly competitive environment with large surpluses saturating the market,
prices can be driven down to a point where the marginal supplier is only covering its
102 Those supplied under long-term agreements were excluded.
103 Freight costs were assumed constant at $10.
104 Venalum C.A. data base.
105 Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfield, Microeconomics, (Macmillan, 1989).
106 Costs had a downward shift mainly as result of technology improvements and the
location of new refineries in low-cost regions.
107 Venalum C.A. data base.
83
average costs, especially if complete production shutdown involves large costs10 8 and/or
withdrawal from strategically important sectors in the industry. Producers may then
continue to operate in order to supply an integrated smelting system, maintain market share,
or because they assume that weak prices will be temporary.
Figure 24 depicts the market equilibrium for different primary aluminum prices. In
this case, the supply and demand curves for 1989 derived in Figures 22 and 23 are used.
Market equilibrium is defined as the price and quantity at which marginal cost equals
marginal revenue, i.e., where the supply curve is equal to the demand curve. The
equilibrium outcome will depend on the chosen primary aluminum price. Hence, it is
important to examine the consequences of changing primary prices on the derived demand
for alumina, and see how the equilibrium result changes.
For primary aluminum prices of 800/lb, 900/lb and 1 10g/lb, the equilibrium price
is about $200 per ton of alumina fob and the equilibrium quantity, approximately 10 million
tons of alumina per year. However, alumina contract prices in 1989 were, at about $275
per ton. 10 9 This difference in price reflected the tight market and the risk of possible
supply shortage. In the case where primary price is 600/lb, equilibrium quantity is lower at
about 9.2 million tons per year. But, interestingly, the equilibrium price does not change.
This situation is similar to what happened during 1982-1987, when the market was in a
surplus position and contracts were priced at approximately competitive equilibrium levels.
One implication that arises from this non-linear situation is that there is no simple
relationship between alumina and primary prices. When primary aluminum prices increase
above 60/lb, increased alumina contract prices will not reflect the competitive equilibrium.
The final price will depend mainly on contractual agreements, the negotiation power of the
108 Not only financial costs have to be considered, but also, especially for state-owned
enterprises, social and political costs to analyze management's decision to shut down
production.
109 Venalum C.A. data base.
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Figure 24. Perfect Competitive Market Equilibrium, 1989.
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parties involved, and the ability of alumina producers to collude. 110 This accounts for the
variation in contract prices, even for prices quoted by the same refinery selling to different
smelters.1 11 In contrast, when the primary aluminum price falls from 60/lb, alumina
prices will mainly reflect competitive equilibria.
This asymmetric response to primary aluminum price arises because the cost
structure of the market is not uniform: to the left of the intersection between D(600/lb) and
the alumina supply curve, the marginal cost curve is flat, almost infinitely elastic; to the
right, the alumina cost schedule rises quite steeply over a small range of production, thus
becoming a quasi-inelastic supply. Also, above 600/lb metal prices, non-integrated alumina
demand is close to its maximum attainable level. Hence, rising primary aluminum prices,
causing the demand curve to move upwards, cannot push it beyond the maximum available
production capacity, and assuming no change in alumina supply, 112 that will increase the
supply shortage risk.
In conclusion, it is worth highlighting the following issues: a rise in the primary
aluminum price above certain level will cause a rapid escalation in alumina price as
smelters' demand rises. Because the alumina supply is a step function, small movements in
the primary price around certain critical values may result in rapid change in alumina
pricing, reflecting a high alumina price sensitivity to changes in capacity. A ceiling on the
competitive alumina price occurs at about $200 per ton, reflecting the operating cost of the
marginal supplier. As primary prices rise above 630/lb, demand for free-market alumina
remains at 10.2 million tons per year. Demand is constrained by the smelting capacity
available to purchase alumina and hence, higher primary aluminum prices will cease to
exert upward pressure on the price of alumina. Given this situation and assuming an
110 F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, (Second
Edition), Rand McNally College, 1980.
111 Venalum C.A. data base.
112 This is a reasonable assumption, given the slow response due to high barriers to entry
and/or exit.
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oligopolistic behavior, above 630/lb is where the dominant firm might be in a position to
exercise market power. This behavior is discussed in the next section.
5.3.3. Oligopoly Pricing Model.
A second behavior to be considered is that driven by the oligopolistic organization
of the industry. The analysis of free-market prices has been confined to the model of
perfect competition, which takes the demand for alumina as given. While justifiable, this
approach is rather restrictive and does not reflect the underlying oligopolistic structure of
the industry. 113 Perfect competition may not always prevail in the alumina market, nor can
demand be viewed as totally independent of the price of aluminum, as shown in Figure 23.
The purpose of this section is to study the oligopolistic model so as to describe the behavior
of the alumina free market. The approach considers the derived supply and demand curves
for the alumina free market based on refineries' marginal costs and smelters' ability or
willingness to pay for alumina at a given price of primary aluminum.
The objective is to investigate the applicability model of dominant behavior to the
alumina industry and compare the outcome with the one assuming a perfect competitive
organization. The theory of the dominant firm is particularly pertinent to the alumina
market, where relatively few producers supply a large number of buyers. In these
circumstances it is conceivable that one or more producers could try to cut back production
and increase prices in order to exert market power.114
As previously stated, the supply side of the non-integrated alumina market is
characterized by a relatively small number of producers. Here the model of perfect
competition, based on the assumption of a large number of small producers, each taking
113 Alcoa has approximately 40% of the total free-market supply, according to Venalum
C.A. data base.
114 F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, (Second
Edition), Rand McNally College, 1980, and Robert S. Pindyck, and Daniel L. Rubinfield,
Microeconomics, (Macmillan, 1989).
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prices as given, may not be appropriate. Rather, a model which allows producers to alter
production levels to influence price may be a more appropriate tool for analyzing the
alumina market.
The framework is that of price leadership where one producer, the price leader, sets
a price which other producers, the followers, take as given. Price is determined by the
leader's adjusting optimal production. The leader first sets a marginal revenue equal to its
marginal cost to achieve optimal production; then, for a given level of production, the price
is set along its demand curve. The obvious candidate for the role of price leadership is
Alcoa of Australia (AA), by far the largest supplier in the market. 115
Figure 25 shows the oligopolistic equilibrium, assuming the 1989 derived supply
and demand curves at a primary aluminum price of 900/lb.11 6 If AA behaves as a price
leader, its profits would be maximized by setting a price for alumina and adjusting
production to sustain this set price, given the derived demand curve and operating costs of
other producers. As Figure 25 shows, the optimal solution to the problem is for AA to set a
price just under $200 per ton of alumina. This can be sustained if AA produces
approximately four million tons per year.117
Average alumina contract prices in 1989 were about $275 per ton fob. The
difference can be explained by the fact that the equilibrium outcome lies in the kinked
areal1 8 of AA's demand [D(Alcoa)]. Therefore, prices are not going to reflect of
equilibrium outcome; but the price at which, as perceived by AA, there is no incentive for
new entrants to build new refineries, or for existing firms to expand their installed capacity.
AA's market power will then depend on how responsive the market is to increases in
115 V.Y. Suslow, "Estimating Monopoly Behavior with Competitive Recycling: An
Application to Alcoa", Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (Autumn 1986): 389-403. The
percentage data if from Venalum C.A. AA accounts for about 41% of the total free-market
supply.
116 It is assumed that the AA marginal cost curve lies between the market supply curve
and the fringe supply curve.
117 Total free-market supply is about 4.8 million tons per year.
118 Kinked area refers to the area where there is a big jump in the demand curve.
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Figure 25. Oligopolistic Equilibrium, 1989.
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contract prices. The greater the barriers to entry into the alumina market, the higher the
price set by Alcoa will be. The capacity to increase prices also depends on how far the
optimal solution lies in the kinked area, the different contractual agreements, and the
capacity for the main alumina suppliers to collude. 1 19 Thus, the potential for boosting
profits by restricting output is highly dependent on the position of the primary aluminum
price and the alumina supply and demand balance.
On the other hand, at a low primary aluminum price, there is too much non-Alcoa
available alumina capacity which could be brought into operation if AA decided to restrict
output in an attempt to raise prices. Under a low price scenario, there is no incentive for AA
to reduce output to affect alumina prices. In this case, industry output and the price level
would be close to the perfect competitive equilibrium.
In general, the incentive for cutting back production to raise prices is greater when
primary prices are high, the smelting sector is operating close to full capacity, and the
alumina free-market balance is tight. However, if the price set by AA is perceived as an
above-normal, long-run marginal price, other competitors may see it as an incentive to
expand capacity, which would then drive prices down to competitive levels. Thus, AA's
strategy would be expected to present a mixture of low and high alumina prices, depending
on the perceived primary price and the parties concerned. This policy would enable AA to
boost its profits by maintaining the balance of the alumina market. Otherwise, new capacity
will shift the supply curve out, and prices will drop to marginal levels, which is exactly
what happened in the mid-1980's.
5.4. Other Factors Influencing Prices.
In assessing the determinants of price and producers supply response to changing
market conditions, it is important to take into account regional imbalances between alumina
119 F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, (Second
Edition), Rand McNally College, 1980, (pp.169-227).
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supply and demand, the relationship between alumina and primary aluminum prices, and
primary aluminum price indices used in contractual agreements.
Regional imbalances and their impact on fob prices is especially true for Europe,
where there is a large deficit of alumina and where the region is dependent, in general,
upon supplies from Latin America and Australia. 120 Due to freight costs, it is logical that
refineries in Latin America, facing the same fob price, will supply the United States East
Coast first, long-term contracts permitting. Assuming the remaining surplus from Latin
America is not sufficient to cover Europe's requirements, supplies from Australia are
necessary. Despite the widespread use of swaps, physical deliveries from Western
Australia are required in Europe, assuming European smelters work close to full capacity.
In terms of sources of supply rather than costs, Australia can be considered the marginal
supplier to Europe.
Australian refineries will then take the market as determined by the relationship
between supply and demand as a reflection of the free-market environment in the short
term. However, to be competitive on a cif basis, producers in Australia would normally be
expected to achieve fob prices slightly lower than the next alternative supplier in Europe or
Latin America due to freight cost differentials. Indeed, assuming a typical freight cost of
$12 per ton from West Coast Australia to Western Europe, compared to $6 per ton from
Ireland, producers in Europe should be able to attain fob prices $6 per ton higher than their
Australian counterparts for the same type of contracts. Similar considerations apply to
relative prices between producers in Latin America and Australia competing for business on
the East Coast of the United States.
In reality, market imperfections rarely permit prices to be determined precisely in
the way theory would suggest. In a tight alumina market such as that experienced during
the past two years, independent European smelters have undoubtedly put pressure on
120 Shearson-Lehman-Hutton, Annual Review of the World Aluminum Industry, 1989, (pp.
41-48).
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nearby suppliers to offer fob prices comparable to those of Australia. However, it is clear
that to be competitive on a cif basis, European refineries would normally be expected to
obtain slightly higher fob prices than those offered to Australian producers. For integrated
European producers located adjacent to or near their smelters, the transfer price will bear a
much closer relationship to the delivered price, since the former reflects the true opportunity
cost to the smelter. Freight costs and regional unbalances are further factors that need to be
taken into account when considering the relationship between costs, prices and production
decisions 12 1.
Another factor that affects prices is the relationship between alumina and primary
aluminum prices. In theory there is no simple, direct relationship as far as new contracts are
concerned. The previous sections have shown that if a perfectly competitive market is
assumed, prices will be driven up/down to the level of operating costs of the marginal
supplier. However, if an oligopolistic market is assumed, prices will be set by the
dominant firm in the industry.
The mechanism by which aluminum prices affect alumina contract prices is
indirectly through shifts in the alumina-derived demand curve. In the absence of any
fundamental change in the cost structure of the primary aluminum and/or alumina
industries, higher prices will result in higher smelter output. Alumina demand is thereby
increased, reducing the amount of surplus capacity available. Consequently, shifts in the
demand for alumina brought about by movements in primary prices will change both the
position and cost of the marginal refinery. 122
Developments in the primary market can influence contract prices due to the relative
bargaining position of refineries and independent smelters. When primary prices are high,
there is less pressure on smelters to obtain the lowest alumina price possible. Smelters may
121 James F. King, "Trends in the Economics of Bauxite and Alumina", Proceedings of
Bauxite Symposium VI, 1986.
122 Ibid.
92
be willing to allow the refineries to share with them above normal profits to ensure security
of supplies. In practice, minimum and maximum price limits protect both smelters and
refineries from excessive primary aluminum price movements.
Finally, events of the past years have focused attention on which primary aluminum
price should be used in contract escalation formulas. 12 3 Although primary prices have
traditionally followed essentially the same pattern, price differentials between aluminum
and alumina have changed considerably. Of particular interest to alumina refiners has been
the extreme volatility of LME prices. Certainly producers who have secured contracts based
on the three-month price have enjoyed more stable alumina prices than companies whose
prices are based on cash quotations. Also, linking the base alumina price to other indexes
would not guarantee any greater stability. In fact on a monthly basis, other price indexes
such as U.S.-Mid-Western Merchant Price Index have fluctuated more widely than either
of the LME three-month prices. 124
Since the main objective is risk avoidance, it is perhaps more important for refiners
to base their alumina contract on primary prices that closely match their realized selling
prices. Although to achieve greater stability refiners may consider using a basket of prices
index which might be less volatile than most other published market related primary
indexes, they will adopt a primary price escalator consistent with their own particular
attitudes towards risk-return and the region to which their alumina is supplied.
123 Escalation formulas refer to those formulas used to adjust prices if conditions change.
124 Venalum C.A. data base.
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Chapter 6
Alumina Refinery Valuation
The purpose of this chapter is to provide CVG with a decision-making instrument
for appraising capital investment and strategic investment planning. A simulation model
using a Net Present Value [NPV] approach is used to derive the valuation results of an
alumina refinery with the capacity of one million tons per year in Venezuela. This model
excludes option equivalents or terminal value cash flows so as to focus the analysis on the
operating sources of value from the perspective of the equity holders.
6.1. Valuation Model.
This valuation studies the underlying economics of an alumina refinery plant and
gives an approximation for its base Net Present Value [NPV]. 125 The analysis does not
consider values created by non-linearities such as: option equivalents, special financing
arrangements or subsidies, tax holidays and/or tax loss carry-forwards, or government
guarantees. A detailed valuation of an international project would have to incorporate these
non-linearities which can be modeled with option pricing techniques.126 Where the project
has a clear, positive NPV, and is mutually exclusive within a set of alternatives, an explicit
risk analysis should be performed to show not only the expected NPV outcome, but also
the NPV probability distribution. The analysis includes depreciation tax shields assuming
straight line depreciation over a 20-year period, and interest tax shields assuming a 36%
125 Most of the data is based on the assumption that the project is to be built in
Venezuela. However, the simulation model is sufficiently flexible to accommodate projects
with different characteristics.
126 Option equivalents are cash flows that respond non-linearly to changes in some
underlying cash flows or asset values. For further discussion, see Robert S. Pindyck,
Irreversibility. Uncertainty, and Investment, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
August, 1989), and Daniel Siegel, James L. Smith, and James L. Paddock, "Valuing Offshore
Oil Properties with Option Pricing Models", Midland Corporate Finance Journal, (5)1,
(Spring 1987).
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corporate tax rate. 127 Even though this is a rather simplified approach, this framework
generates a first approximation solution which can be used as an effective decision-making
tool in studying the main economic variables for an alumina refinery project.
Modem finance theory provides us with a general equilibrium framework for the
valuation of capital assets under uncertainty: the Capital Asset Pricing Model [CAPM] 128.
Initially formulated in the context of perfect markets and one period projects, it has been
extended to cover multiperiod projects. 129 The CAPM gives the theoretical foundations for
the NPV investment decision rule.
For complex projects, where agents operate in imperfect, often incomplete and
segmented capital markets, investment and financing decisions are not independent,
therefore it is necessary to include in the analysis any value created by complex contractual
or financial agreements. The NPV additivity principle will permit adding to the base NPV
any value created by non-linearities in the project. The NPV approach provides present
value estimates of cash flows to the different agents depending on their contractually agreed
share of expected future cash flows. In this way, the efficiency of a contract structure and
its risk allocation should be evaluated. 130 The usefulness of the NPV approach is the
recognition of the sources of economic value accrued to various agents as a result of the
financial structure.
The alumina refinery project is considered a stand-alone project whose cash flows
are the collateral for long and short-term debt agreements. This is referred to as project
127 CVG-Planificaci6n Corporativa. Expected tax rate for new projects.
128 To review the model, see Michael C. Jensen, "Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence,"
The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, (3)2, (Autumn 1972): 357-398,
and David W. Mullins, "Does the Capital Assets Pricing Model Work?," Harvard Business
Review, (January-February, 1982).
129 Eugene F. Fama, "Risk-Adjusted Discount Rates and Capital Budgeting Theory under
Uncertainty," Journal of Financial Economics, 5, (August 1977): 3-24.
1 30 Contract valuation is beyond the scope of this thesis. For reference, see Charles
Blitzer, Donald R. Lessard, and James L. Paddock, "Risk Bearing and the Choice of Contract
Forms for Oil Exploration and Development," report prepared for the Corporaci6n Estatal
Petrolera Ecuatoriana, MIT, Energy Lab, 1982.
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financing , i.e. the "financing of a particular economic unit in which the lender is satisfied
to look initially to the cash flows and earnings of that economic unit as the source of funds
from which a loan will be repaid and to the assets of the economic unit as the collateral for
the loan." 13 1
The simulation model does the analysis from an equity point of view. To define
each of the cash flow components for the valuation model, Interalumina C.A.'s 1986-1988
financial statements were first analyzed. The idea was to build the pro-formas for the
project as if it were to be run by Interalumina C.A., a reasonable assumption given the
company's competitive performance since it began operating in the mid-1970's. The free
cash flows to equity are defined in Table 13.
Table 13. Free Cash Flows to Equity.
Net Income before dividends
Plus: Depreciation
Minus: Change in Working Capital
Capital Expenditures
Debt Repayment
Plus: Other income
Other non-cash items deducted in the Income Statement
Source: Paul Asquith, class notes, and James L. Paddock, class notes.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model [CAPM] was used in defining the cost of capital to
the equity components in the valuation. According to the CAPM, an appropriate risk-
adjusted discount rate must include both the riskless rate of the interest and a risk premium,
reflecting only the systematic risk of the cash flow. The discount rate therefore must
depend on the systematic risk of alumina price revenues, operating cash flows, and the
relevant portfolio of risky assets. It is assumed that CVG-AL operates internationally
whose set of risky assets is the the world capital market. Since the U.S. capital market
commands such a large proportion of the world market portfolio, the risk-free rate and the
expected excess return on the market are based on the U.S. capital market.
131 Peter K. Nevitt, "Project Financing," Euromoney Publications, (London, 1979), p. 13.
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For government participation, in this case represented by CVG-Aluminum, the
discount rate estimates provided by the CAPM also represent a good approximation to its
economic cost of equity capital. Assuming CVG-Aluminum does not have the required
technical, financial and/or managerial expertise to carry on alumina development, it is likely
they would have to sign service contracts. 13 2 Therefore, CVG-Aluminum participation, if
not invested in the project, would be invested in comparatively international funds during
the same period. Consequently, the discount rate for CVG-Aluminum's cash flow is the
marginal cost of incremental funds invested in international capital markets, reflecting the
systematic risk of the alumina project which is close to the discount rate obtained using the
CAPM.
This assumption may be too restrictive, given the availability of domestic inputs
such as energy, labor and bauxite. Energy is a non-tradeable good, which is currently
priced in dollars at its long-run marginal costs, though closely reflecting its opportunity
cost or economic price. The required labor would be rather specialized and therefore would
be assumed as a mobile factor priced at market levels, except for some exchange rate
distortions. Finally, while bauxite supplies are currently imported at $34.5 per ton, it is
expected that the Los Pijiguaos mine will cover all Venezuelan bauxite requirements. It is
beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze whether the Venezuelan bauxite can be sold
internationally. Nevertheless, this is an important fact to be considered given that the
project's bauxite cost should reflect the opportunity costs of using Los Pijiguaos's bauxite
domestically instead of exporting it. As an approximation for the bauxite opportunity costs,
the World Bank scenario of $25 per ton of bauxite in 1985 dollar terms is considered as the
base case scenario1 33 [see Figure 26]. This approximation coincides with Bauxiven's
target of pricing its bauxite at $25 per ton cif.
132 It should be remembered that technology is in the hands of the six Integrated Majors.
133 The World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities, (Washington D.C.,
The World Bank, 1989), p. 220.
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Figure 26. Bauxite Expected Prices. The World Bank.
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The project systematic risk is defined through its Beta before adjusted for desired
leveraged. It is this risk component in the CAPM which represents asset volatility
compared to the asset and the market covariance. In the case of an alumina project, the Beta
is around 0.95. In the simulations, a Beta of 0.92 was used, the average for the major
aluminum companies' Beta. 134 However, this average value is an unleveraged Beta,
though at any period the project's Beta was releveraged depending on the debt-equity ratio
at the end of each period. 135
The estimated risk by the Beta component represents the systematic risk of the
asset. While the fiscal risk was not explicitly considered in this study, it should
nevertheless be evaluated explicitly in the case of international investors. This will affect
the probability distribution of expected cash flows. Fiscal risk is defined as "the risk of
contractual non-performance by the host government in the form of a unilateral change in
stated fiscal terms, if excess profits are earned by the foreign investor because of price or
discovery windfalls." 136
For debt components, a 10% cost of debt is used. This approximates the nominal
interest rate of the project loan under consideration by competitive international markets
without government guarantees, 137 reflecting the appropriate nominal discount rate for
debt contracts. It also reflects the low risk that debt cash flows have due to high interest-
coverage ratios, and the customary high debt-equity ratio employed in this type of project.
The debt-equity ratio is expected to be around 70% during the initial periods.
134 Standard and Poors, Stock Reports NYSE, Jan. 1990-Feb. 1990. See also, Faiz Makdisi-
Ilyas, Financial Evaluation of a Bauxite Mining and Alumina Plant Project, Unpublished
Thesis, Sloan School of Management, 1980, pp. 35-42.
135 Leveraged Betas and the Cost of Equity, Harvard Business School Case 9-288-036,
1988.
136 Panos Cavaulacos, The Impact of Fiscal Risk on Petroleum Investments Unpublished
PhD thesis, Department of Nuclear Engineering, M.I.T., June, 1987.
137 Venalum C.A. data base.
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In reality, the correct evaluation of the present value of the project loans is very
complicated, because it must incorporate the contract's option features. In fact, interest
payments are usually not contractually fixed, since they are payable at a spread over the
chosen base rate on the outstanding principal. The valuation of project loans by option
pricing techniques would be rather interesting, however, it is not the concern of this study.
For simplicity, it is assumed that CVG has borrowed the total required external financing
through a single project-financing entity, the alumina refinery; and that interest payments
and principal repayment are payable in assuming an annuity type schedule.
Terminal values of the assets are not considered. Given that the simulation is run
for 20 years, terminal present values of the assets will have little impact on the result.
Further, if the refinery is built as a state-owned enterprise, it is unlikely to be sold or
privatized over its life.
This valuation exercise is intended to serve as a decision-making tool and can be
used not only for valuation purposes, but as a tool for risk analysis, as well as for defining
contractual efficient arrangements. Table 14 shows the parameters used in the simulation.
According to the strategic analysis developed in previous chapters, these are the most
sensitive parameters. The simulation results are explained in the following section.
6.2. Results.
The results are not intended to be deterministic. The objective is to show a range of
values which will permit the decision maker to define different scenarios and ascertain
which variables are the most sensitive. It is important to see how these variables change
and how responsive they are in order to allocate risks efficiently among the concerned
parties. Appendix A shows the tables in addition to the operating cost, capital costs and
base case parameters required to resemble the results. Appendix B contains additional
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simulation figures on different variables which have relatively low impact on the NPV
outcome.
Table 14. Base Case Simulation Parameters.
Alumina Price
Alumina Production Schedule
Inflation Rate
Investment Costs
Construction Period
Percentage Construction Completion per Year
Depreciation Period
Bauxite Costs
Caustic Soda Costs
Energy Costs
Labor Costs
Equity Participation
Debt Participation
Interest Rate on Debt
Debt Repayment Period
Pre-opening and Organization Costs
Amortization Period for Preop.&Org.Costs
Unleveraged Beta for the Project
Risk Free Rate138
Market Risk Premium1 39
275 ($/ton)
('000 ton,year)
(100,3);(650,4);(900,5);(1000,5-22)
1.04 (1+%/year)
800,000 ($'000)
3 (Years, 2<>6)
(1,20%);(2,40%);(3,40%) (%,year)
20 (Years)
25 ($/ton Bauxite)
200 ($/ton Caustic Soda)
15 ($/ton Alumina)
15 ($/ton Alumina)
30(%)
70(%)
10(%)
15 (Years)
8,200 ($'000)
5 (Years)
0.92
0.08
0.086
Figure 27 shows capital outlays during the construction period. The main
assumptions are: (1) There is no debt repayment made during this period, (2) interests
accrue until the end of the period, (3) working capital needs are determined by two months
of operating requirements, and (4) debt-holders' participation does not begin until equity-
holders have invested their 100% participation. Note the assumption that there is no
difference between interest rates on debt during construction and debt after construction.
138 Interest rate on long term US Government bonds.
139 Roger Ibbotson and Rex Sinquifield, Stocks. Bonds. Bills, and Inflation: Historical
Returns (1926-1978),, Charlottesville, VA., Financial Analysis Research Foundation,
1979.
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Figure 27. Construction Period Investment Outlays.
1 2 End of the Year
900000 -
800000 -
700000 -
600000 -
500000 -
400000 -
300000 -
200000 -
100000 -
0 -
M Debt [Working Capital]
* Interest Construction
* Debt [Fixed Capital]
E Equity
I
|($'000)
Even though higher interest rates are expected during construction, for the sake of
simplicity it is better to leave everything at constant rates.
Figures 28 to 30 show the the range of possible cumulative NPV results assuming a
base case scenario, a pessimistic scenario, and an optimistic scenario. A constant real
alumina price trajectory is assumed, a uniform inflation rate of 4% per year, and a changing
nominal discount rate depending on the debt-equity ratio at the end of the period. It is clear,
given these assumptions, that the most likely NPV is always close to zero, and that the
breakeven outcome is far later in the future, always after Year 20. It is important to note the
impact of high initial capital outlays. If the project does not have a steady stream of high
cash flows, it will be impossible to make it profitable.
Figure 28 shows the sensitivity to alumina prices. Of all the variables, this is the
most volatile. The cumulative NPV outcomes range from approximately plus $200 million
to minus $200 million. This wide distribution of outcomes can be explained by high
volatility in alumina prices, the imperfections that still exist in the market, and the risks
associated with the physical nature of alumina. This is why refineries are forced to engage
in contractual agreements to guarantee the allocation and price of their output for which, if
risks are well diversified, the expected NPV outcome is zero. The zero NPV outcome for
the most likely scenario indicates that, for an average cost producer, there is no incentive to
expand capacity.
The price sensitivity to changes in available capacity analyzed in Chapter 5 also
explains the wide range in the cumulative NPV. If the refinery chooses to rely on short-
term contracts and/or the spot market, its operating cash flows will be highly volatile, as a
result of changes in industry capacity. As we saw in Chapter 5, when the market is
balanced, alumina prices do reflect market equilibrium. Usually, prices are higher than the
market equilibrium due to the premium that alumina buyers are willing to pay to avoid the
supply shortage risk. On the other hand, if there is a surplus capacity, alumina prices will
reflect the competitive equilibrium.
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Figure 28. Sensitivity to Alumina Prices ($/ton).
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Figure 29. Sensitivity to Bauxite Costs, ($/ton).
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Figure 30. Sensitivity to Investment Costs, ($/ton Alumina).
Cumulative NPV
($1000)
Years
100000
50000
0
-50000
-100000
-150000
-200000
-250000
-300000
/
Figure 29 and 30 show the sensitivity to bauxite and investment costs respectively.
These variables are not as sensitive as the alumina price, however, the range between plus
$100 million and minus $100 million is important to be considered. Bauxite sensitivity
affects the NPV outcome in a way similar to the alumina price. Its sensitivity is largely
explained because bauxite represents more than 50% of total operating costs.
In the case of investments costs, impact occurs during the construction period.
Although the NPV is not as sensitive to these costs compared to alumina prices or bauxite
costs, we consider it the most important variable of the three, because these costs are
endogenous, can be controlled internally to some extent by the firm, and because once
investment costs are committed, the final outcome is almost defined. If the cost of the
refinery is above $800 per ton, it will be almost impossible to make the project profitable.
Figures 31 and 32 show the sensitivity to the construction period. If percentage
completion is distributed proportionally over the construction period, there is a major
difference in the resultant cumulative NPV. These figures represent the NPV as a function
of different investment costs for any given bauxite and alumina price. Because non-
linearities are not included in the simulation, all relations are linear. The following
equations define the set of schedules plotted in Figures 31 and 32:
For 3-year construction period [Figure 31]:
NPV(3-yrs)=-0.40*Cap.Inv+[2.47*Alumina-6.67*Bauxite-0.16*CausticSoda-2.85*Energy-131.56]
For 5-year construction period [Figure 32]:
NPV(5-yrs.)=-27Cap.Inv+[1.66*Alumina-4.43*Bauxite-139.58]
As the construction period increases the capital investment coefficient and the
intercept decrease, if some delay occurs during construction it will be harder to turn the
project profitable. As the capital investment coefficient decreases, the project's upside
potential decreases considerably. Even though the slope changes, the spread between
curves in both sets is almost the same, showing that sensitivity to bauxite costs is
exogenous to the project.
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Figure 31. NPV for Different Investment Costs, 3-yr Construction Period.
500.00 T NPV ($millions)
400.00
300.00X
200.00
100.00
0.00 -
41
-100.00 -
-200.00 -
-300.00 -
-400.00 -
-Bx.=$10/ton Alumina;
Alumina=$200/ton
0-Bx.=$25/ton Alumina;
Alumina=$200/ton
-Bx.=$40/ton Alumina;
Alumina=$200/ton
0 Bx.=$ 10/ton Alumina;
Alumina=$275/ton
Bx.=$25/ton Alumina;
Alumina=$275/ton
f Bx.=$40/ton Alumina;
Alumina=$275/ton
X Bx.=$ 10/ton Alumina;
Alumina=$350/ton
X Bx.=$25/ton Alumina;
Alumina=$350/ton
---Bx.=$40/ton Alumina;
Alumina=$350/ton
I EU
Figure 32. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Construction Period 5-yrs.
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Figures 33 and 34 show how insensitive the project is to changes in energy and
caustic soda prices. Although in the cost structure analysis energy exhibited a high
variability in energy costs among firms and regions, the NPV outcome is not that sensitive
to this variable. This explains the fact that refineries in India having extremely high energy
costs are operating. On the other hand, CVG's refinery, with one of the lowest energy
costs in the industry, has average operating costs due to high bauxite costs.
The results of the NPV sensitivity analysis to alumina prices, and investment,
bauxite, energy and caustic soda costs indicate that, in all cases, the base case scenario has
a zero NPV outcome and the breakeven point is far in the future. Competitive advantage in
alumina investments stems primarily from low bauxite costs and low investment costs. It is
important to note the irrelevance of changes in energy and caustic soda costs. CVG-Al's
main concern should be its high bauxite costs, thus shifting the company's focus to its
bauxite operations as the first priority.
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Figure 33. NPV for Different Energy Costs.
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Figure 34. NPV for Different Caustic Soda Prices. Alumina Price $275/ton. Construction Period 3-
yrs.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Recommendations
An increase in alumina capacity above its current capacity of two million tons per
year is not recommended. If increases in alumina capacity are targeting the primary
aluminum expansion program in Venezuela, 140 and CVG-Aluminum will only have
approximately 20% equity participation, what is the interest in promoting a zero-NPV
alumina project? Since CVG-Aluminum, through its subsidiary Interalumina C.A., is
currently long in aluminal 41 , and given expectations of a higher NPV for primary
aluminum investments, where should CVG-Aluminum focus its capital investment
resources?
Currently, CVG is in an inefficient position. Its alumina sector is long when the
market is expected to decline, primary expansions have been delayed, and the bauxite mine
has not yet began to produce efficiently. Given this transitory situation, the aluminum
sector should be restructured with emphasis in cost optimization policies, to respond to an
integrated strategy taking into account Venezuela's comparative advantages in aluminum
and the current economic situation.
Venezuela has clear competitive advantages in producing primary aluminum. These
advantages stem from low-cost sources of energy, a long alumina position, and an
anticipated decrease in bauxite costs. The combination of these advantages and an expected
stable primary aluminum market1 42 permit CVG-AL to take a more aggressive position in
primary aluminum, and to bear some of the risks associated with the industry, such as
alumina price volatility, and concentration levels on downstream markets. By increasing
140 The objective is to reach two million tons per year of installed capacity by the year
2000.
141 Current primary production is about 600k tons per year, requiring approximately
1,200k tons of alumina per year.
142 Shearson-Lehman-Hutton, Annual Review of the World Aluminum Industry, (1989),
pp. 41-48.
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primary aluminum capacity, the option to expand downstream by merging and/or joint
ventures provides CVG-AL with flexibility in designing an optimal investment plan. In
considering any upstream capacity expansion, CVG-AL should first exhaust all alternatives
provided by external markets for structuring a balanced portfolio of contracts and securities
to optimize its desired risk-return position.
The integration of alumina and bauxite operations does not depend on the
assumption of a particular market structure; but, rather, on certain technical and economic
arguments, such as the non-homogeneity of bauxite, the scale of production, and the
importance of freight costs. The integration of alumina and primary aluminum operations
however, does depend on the existence of a particular industry organization. This is an
important distinction, in that if vertical integration depends on technical and economic
factors, a vertical structure is recommended. The recommendation will not change unless
there is some change in technology, such as in production processes or minimum efficient
scale. But, if vertical integration depends on the organization of the industry, then optimal
organization can change from being vertically integrated to a more competitive
environment, as conditions change.
There has been a long and slow process of disintegration at the industry level as the
share of integrated producers has gradually declined. The segmentation and growth of the
alumina and primary aluminum markets have reduced the risk of not being integrated across
these markets, thus reducing the need for being vertically integrated. With the growth,
particularly of Independent Smelters and Miner/Refiners, the rules of the game have
changed to that of a quasi-competitive organization.
As a result of this disintegration process, the overall importance of the Integrated
Majors will continue to be reduced by the growth of the Independent Smelters group. In
addition, intensified rivalry among members of the Integrated group will occur as they all
seek to exploit down-stream markets, and as the industry globalization trend continues to
occur. The long process of declining integration at the industry level is expected to
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continue, and will be influenced by the economic cycle where disintegration is going to be
accelerated by economic troughs and retarded by strong economic conditions.
The alumina industry has an oligopolistic underlying structure which, if primary
prices are low, the optimal price is close or equal to its competitive equilibrium. If primary
aluminum prices are high, however, the dominant firm, Alcoa of Australia, sets an
optimum price, which is much higher than the perfect competitive price. Prices not only
depend on supply and demand balance, but on different factors and contractual agreements
such as the length of the contract, escalation formulas, freight costs, aluminum prices,
negotiation power of the parties concerned, and the ability of the producers to collude. This
situation arises because supply and demand curves are characterized by being almost
perfectly elastic at low cost ends. But, for the marginal firm, these curves change to an
inelastic condition. Therefore, at the margin the market is highly sensitive to changes in
alumina capacity.
As a result of high sensitivity to capacity changes, the alumina market experienced a
high volatility in prices. This is why it is in the interest of Second-Tier producers to serve
as catalysts in new alumina projects when the market is close to balanced. By investing in
capacity expansions, Second-Tier producers will guarantee low alumina prices and more
importantly, stable contracts for their alumina requirements. On the other hand, firms with
long alumina position, such as CVG, would be interested in maintaining a tight alumina
market.
Finally, from Venezuela's perspective, non-positive NPV projects should not be
undertaken, even if they are supported on the grounds of being catalysts for economic
development. To foster sustainable, long-term growth, Venezuela should pursue strong
projects which do not require subsidies or preferential financing arrangements to make
them profitable.
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Appendix A
This appendix contains additional tables required to obtain the
base case results. The following tables are included:
Tables 15a-15c. Income Statement.
Tables 16a-16c. Balance Sheet.
Tables 17a-17c. Loan Schedule.
Tables 18a-18c. Free-Cash Flows to Equity.
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Table 15a. Income Statement ($'000)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
YearEnd 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Inflation Rate 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.12 1.17 1.22 1.27 1.32 1.37 1.42
Net Sales
Cost of Goods Sold
Gross Profit
Selling, General and Administrative
Depreciation
Amortization Preop. Exp. & Org. Cos
Total Operating Expenses
Net Operating Incom
Interest Expense @ 36%
Earnings before Taxes
Income Taxes
Net Income
Dividends
0 30,934 209,112
0 12,987 87,792
0 17,947 121,320
0 1,547 10,456
0 0 40,000
0 0 1,640
0 1,547 52,096
0 16,400 69,225
24,718 62,006 64,786
(24,718) (45,606) 4,438
0 0 1,598
(24,718) (45,606) 2,841
0 0 2.556
301,122
126,420
174,701
15,056
40,000
1,640
56,696
118,005
60,055
57,951
20,862
37,088
33.380
347,963
146,086
201,877
17,398
40,000
1,640
59,038
142,839
57,908
84,931
30,575
54,356
48.920
361,881
151,929
209,952
18,094
40,000
1,640
59,734
150,218
55,547
94,672
34,082
60,590
54.531
376,356
158,006
218,350
18,818
40,000
1,640
60,458
157,893
52,949
104,944
37,780
67,164
60.447
391,411
164,326
227,084
19,571
40,000
0
59,571
167,514
50,092
117,422
42,272
75,150
67.635
Table 15b. Income Statement ($'000) (cont.)
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Year End 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Inflation Rate 1.48 1.54 1.60 1.67 1.73 1.80 1.87 1.95 2.03 2.11
Net Sales 407,067 423,350 440,284 457,895 476,211 495,259 515,070 535,673 557,100 579,384
Cost of Goods Sold 170,899 177,735 184,845 192,239 199,928 207,925 216,242 224,892 233,888 243,243
- Gross Profit 236,168 245,615 255,439 265,657 276,283 287,334 298,828 310,781 323,212 336,140
00 Selling, General and Administrative 20,353 21,167 22,014 22,895 23,811 24,763 25,753 26,784 27,855 28,969
Depreciation 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000
Amortization Preop. Exp. & Org. Cos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Operating Expenses 60,353 61,167 62,014 62,895 63,811 64,763 65,753 66,784 67,855 68,969
Net Operating Incorr 175,814 184,447 193,425 202,762 212,472 222,571 233,074 243,997 255,357 267,171
Interest Expense @ 36% 46,949 43,491 39,688 35,505 30,903 25,841 20,273 14,148 7,411 0
Earnings before Taxes 128,866 140,956 153,737 167,257 181,569 196,730 212,801 229,849 247,946 267,171
Income Taxes 46,392 50,744 55,345 60,212 65,365 70,823 76,608 82,746 89,261 96,182
Net Income 82,474 90,212 98,391 107,044 116,204 125,907 136,193 147,103 158,685 170,990
Dividends 74,227 81,190 88,552 96,340 104,584 113,316 122,573 132,393 142,817 153,891
Table 15c. Income Statement ($'000) (cont.)
20 21 22 23 24 25
Year End 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Inflation Rate 2.19 2.28 2.37 2.46 2.56 2.67
Net Sales 602,559 626,661 651,728 677,797 704,909 733,105
Cost of Goods Sold 252,973 263,092 273,615 284,560 295,942 307,780
Gross Profit 349,586 363,569 378,112 393,237 408,966 425,325
Selling, General and Administrative 30,128 31,333 32,586 33,890 35,245 36,655
Depreciation 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 0 0
Amortization Preop. Exp. & Org. Cos 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Operating Expenses 70,128 71,333 72,586 73,890 35,245 36,655
Net Operating Incorr 279,458 292,236 305,526 319,347 373,721 388,670
Interest Expense @ 36% 0 0 0 0 0 0
Earnings before Taxes 279,458 292,236 305,526 319,347 373,721 388,670
Income Taxes 100,605 105,205 109,989 114,965 134,539 139,921
Net Income 178,853 187,031 195,537 204,382 239,181 248,749
Dividends 160,968 168,328 175,983 183,944 215,263 223,874
Table 16a. Balance Sheet ($'000)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Year End 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Inflation Rate 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.12 1.17 1.22 1.27 1.32 1.37
Assets
Current Assets
Cash and Marketable Securities 0 0 0 0 10,450 10,920 11,412 11,925 12,462
Accounts Receivables 0 0 0 2,543 17,187 24,750 28,600 29,744 30,933
Inventories 0 0 0 4,640 31,367 45,168 52,194 54,282 56,453
Prepaid Expenses 0 0 0 309 2,091 3,011 3,480 3,619 3,764
Total Current Assets 0 0 0 7,492 61,095 83,849 95,685 99,570 103,612
Property, Plant and Equipment, net 0 160,000 480,000 800,000 760,000 720,000 680,000 640,000 600,000
Preopening Expenses & Org. Costs 8,200 8,200 8,200 8,200 6,560 4,920 3,280 1,640 0
Other Assets 0 0 0 1,856 12,547 18,067 20,878 21,713 22,581
Total Fixed Assets 8,200 168,200 488,200 810,056 779,107 742,987 704,158 663,353 622,581
Total Assets 8,200 168,200 488,200 817,548 840,202 826,837 799,843 762,923 726,194
Liabilities and Net Worth
Current Llabilities
Short Term Debt 0 0 0 0 27,802 0 0 0 0
Account Payable 0 0 0 1,449 9,412 11,525 12,585 12,659 13,165
Total Current Liabilities 0 0 0 1,449 37,214 11,525 12,585 12,659 13,165
Portion to Social Security Benefits 0 0 0 619 4,182 6,022 6,959 7,238 7,527
Long Term Debt 0 0 247,176 620,063 600,547 579,080 555,466 529,491 500,918
Total Fixed Liabilities 0 0 247,176 620,682 604,730 585,102 562,425 536,728 508,445
Total Liabilities 0 0 247,176 622,130 641,944 596,627 575,010 549,387 521,610
Net Worth 8,200 168,200 512,918 885,804 866,289 839,684 756,338
Common Stock 8,200 168,200 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741
Retained Earnings 0 0 (24,718) (70,324) (67,483) (30,395) 23,961 84,551 151,715
Total Net Worth 8,200 168,200 241,024 195,417 198,258 230,209 224,833 213,536 204,584
Total Liabilities & Net Worth 8,200 168,200 488,200 817,548 840,202 831,974 864,712 899,679 939,066
Dividends 0 0 0 0 0 5,137 64,869 136,756 212,872
tal Liabilities & Net Worth. After Div. 8,200 168,200 488,200 817,548 840,202 826,837 799,843 762,923 726,194
Table 16b. Balance Sheet ($'000) (cont.)
9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
YearEnd 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Inflation Rate 1.42 1.54 1.60 1.67 1.73 1.80 1.87 1.95 2.03
Assets
Current Assets
Cash and Marketable Securities 13,023 14,221 14,861 15,530 16,229 16,959 17,722 18,519 19,353
Accounts Receivables 32,171 34,796 36,188 37,635 39,141 40,706 42,335 44,028 45,789
Inventories 58,712 63,502 66,043 68,684 71,432 74,289 77,260 80,351 83,565
Prepaid Expenses 3,914 4,233 4,403 4,579 4,762 4,953 5,151 5,357 5,571
Total Current Assets 107,819 116,753 121,494 126,428 131,563 136,907 142,468 148,255 154,278
Property, Plant and Equipment, net 560,000 480,000 440,000 400,000 360,000 320,000 280,000 240,000 200,000
Preopening Expenses & Org. Costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Assets 23,485 25,401 26,417 27,474 28,573 29,716 30,904 32,140 33,426
Total Fixed Assets 583,485 505,401 466,417 427,474 388,573 349,716 310,904 272,140 233,426
Total Assets 691,304 622,154 587,911 553,902 520,136 486,622 453,372 420,395 387,704
Liabilities and Net Worth
Current Liabilities
Short Term Debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Account Payable 13,692 14,809 15,401 16,018 16,658 17,325 18,018 18,738 19,488
Total Current Liabilities 13,692 14,809 15,401 16,018 16,658 17,325 18,018 18,738 19,488
Portion to Social Security Benefits 7,828 8,467 8,806 9,158 9,524 9,905 10,301 10,713 11,142
Long Term Debt 469,487 396,883 355,050 309,033 258,414 202,733 141,485 74,111 0
Total Fixed Liabilities 477,315 405,350 363,855 318,191 267,938 212,638 151,786 84,824 11,142
Total Liabilities 491,007 420,159 379,257 334,208 284,596 229,963 169,803 103,563 30,630
Net Worth
Common Stock 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741
Retained Earnings 226,865 399,551 497,942 604,986 721,191 847,098 983,290 1,130,393 1,289,079
Total Net Worth 200,296 201,994 208,654 219,694 235,539 256,659 283,568 316,833 357,074
Total Liabilities & Net Worth 983,614 1,085,451 1,142,940 1,204,936 1,271,528 1,342,802 1,418,835 1,499,697 1,585,450
Dividends 292,310 463,297 555,029 651,034 751,393 856,180 965,463 1,079,302 1,197,746
tal Liabilities & Net Worth. After Div. 691,304 622,154 587,911 553,902 520,136 486,622 453,372 420,395 387,704
Table 16c. Balance Sheet ($'000) (cont.)
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
YearEnd 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Inflation Rate 2.11 2.19 2.28 2.37 2.46 2.56 2.67
Assets
Current Assets
Cash and Marketable Securities 20,224 21,134 22,085 23,079 24,117 25,202 26,337
Accounts Receivables 47,621 49,525 51,506 53,567 55,709 57,938 60,255
Inventories 86,908 90,384 93,999 97,759 101,670 105,736 109,966
Prepaid Expenses 5,794 6,026 6,267 6,517 6,778 7,049 7,331
Total Current Assets 160,546 167,069 173,857 180,922 188,274 195,925 203,889
Property, Plant and Equipment, net 160,000 120,000 80,000 40,000 0 0 0
Preopening Expenses & Org. Costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Assets 34,763 36,154 37,600 39,104 40,668 42,295 43,986
Total Fixed Assets 194,763 156,154 117,600 79,104 40,668 42,295 43,986
Total Assets 355,309 323,222 291,457 260,025 228,942 238,220 247,875
Liabilities and Net Worth
Current Liabilities
Short Term Debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Account Payable 20,267 21,078 21,921 22,798 23,710 24,658 25,645
Total Current Liabilities 20,267 21,078 21,921 22,798 23,710 24,658 25,645
Portion to Social Security Benefits 11,588 12,051 12,533 13,035 13,556 14,098 14,662
Long Term Debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Fixed Liabilities 11,588 12,051 12,533 13,035 13,556 14,098 14,662
Total Liabilities 31,855 33,129 34,454 35,833 37,266 38,756 40,307
Net Worth
Common Stock 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741 265,741
Retained Earnings 1,460,068 1,638,921 1,825,953 2,021,489 2,225,871 2,465,053 2,713,801
Total Net Worth 323,454 290,093 257,002 224,193 191,676 199,464 207,568
Total Liabilities & Net Worth 1,757,665 1,937,792 2,126,148 2,323,063 2,528,878 2,769,550 3,019,849
Dividends 1,402,356 1,614,570 1,834,692 2,063,038 2,299,937 2,531,330 2,771,974
tal Liabilities & Net Worth. After Div. 355,309 323,222 291,457 260,025 228,942 238,220 247,875
Table 17a. Loan Schedule @ 10/6, 15yrs ($'000)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year End 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Inflation Rate 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.12 1.17 1.22 1.27 1.32 1.37 1.42
Debt Financing
Debt Balance 0 0 0 620,063 620,063 600,547 579,080 555,466 529,491 500,918
Debt Repayment 0 0 0 0 81,522 81,522 81,522 81,522 81,522 81,522
Interest 0 0 0 0 62,006 60,055 57,908 55,547 52,949 50,092
AMT 0 0 0 0 19,516 21,467 23,614 25,975 28,573 31,430
Balance end Year 0 0 0 620,063 600,547 579,080 555,466 529,491 500,918 469,487
Total Interest 0 0 0 0 62,006 60,055 57,908 55,547 52,949 50,092
Total Amortization 0 0 0 0 19,516 21,467 23,614 25,975 28,573 31,430
Table 17b. Loan Schedule @ 10%, 15yrs ($'000) (cont.).
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Year End 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Inflation Rate 1.48 1.54 1.60 1.67 1.73 1.80 1.87 1.95 2.03 2.11
Debt Financing
Debt Balance 469,487 434,914 396,883 355,050 309,033 258,414 202,733 141,485 74,111 0
Debt Repayment 81,522 81,522 81,522 81,522 81,522 81,522 81,522 81,522 81,522 0
Interest 46,949 43,491 39,688 35,505 30,903 25,841 20,273 14,148 7,411 0
AMT 34,573 38,031 41,834 46,017 50,619 55,681 61,249 67,374 74,111 0
Balance end Year 434,914 396,883 355,050 309,033 258,414 202,733 141,485 74,111 0 0
Total Interest 46,949 43,491 39,688 35,505 30,903 25,841 20,273 14,148 7,411 0
Total Amortization 34,573 38,031 41,834 46,017 50,619 55,681 61,249 67,374 74,111 0
Table 17c. Loan Schedule @ 10%, 15yrs ($'000) (cont.).
20 21 22 23 24 25
Year End 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Inflation Rate 2.19 2.28 2.37 2.46 2.56 2.67
Debt Financing
Debt Balance 0 0 0 0 0 0
Debt Repayment 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest 0 0 0 0 0 0
AMT 0 0 0 0 0 0
Balance end Year 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Interest 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Amortization 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 18a. Free Cash Flow to Equity ($'000).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year End 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Inflation Rate 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.12 1.17 1.22 1.27 1.32 1.37 1.42
Net Income 0 0 (24,718) (45,606) 284 3,709 5,436 6,059 6,716 7,515
Dividends 5,137 59,732 71,888 76,116 79,438
Change in Working Capital 0 0 0 (7,492) (53,603) (22,754) (11,836) (3,884) (4,042) (4,207)
Capital Expenditures (8,214) (160,000) (320,000) (320,000) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation 0 0 0 0 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000
Extras:
Amt. Preop. & Org. Cos 0 0 0 0 0 1,640 1,640 1,640 1,640 1,640
Debt Repayment 0 0 247,176 372,887 8,286 (49,269) (23,614) (25,975) (28,573) (31,430)
FCFe (8,214) (160,000) (97,541) (211) (5,033) (21,537) 71,357 89,727 91,857 92,955
Discounted FCFe (8,214) (138,036) (68,049) (118) (2,312) (8,190) 22,442 23,383 19,883 16,763
Table 18b. Free Cash Flow to equity ($'000).
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Year End 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Inflation Rate 1.48 1.54 1.60 1.67 1.73 1.80 1.87 1.95 2.03 2.11
Net Income
Dividends
Change in Working Capital
Capital Expenditures
Depreciation
Extras:
Amt. Preop. & Org. Cos
Debt Repayment
FCFe
Discounted FCFe
8,247
83,444
(4,378)
0
40,000
0
(34,573)
92,741
13,988
9,021
87,543
(4,556)
0
40,000
0
(38,031)
93,978
11,918
9,839
91,731
(4,741)
0
40,000
0
(41,834)
94,996
10,200
10,704
96,005
(4,934)
0
40,000
0
(46,017)
95,758
8,791
11,620 12,591 13,619 14,710 15,869
100,359 104,787 109,283 113,839 118,444
(5,135) (5,344) (5,561) (5,787) (6,023)
0 0 0 0 0
40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000
0
(50,619)
96,226
7,660
0
(55,681)
96,354
6,797
0
(61,249)
96,093
6,220
0
(67,374)
95,388
6,029
0
(74,111)
94,179
6,601
17,099
204,610
(6,268)
0
40,000
0
0
255,441
15,447A
Table 18c. Free Cash Flow to equity ($'000).
20 21 22 23 24 25
Year End 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Inflation Rate 2.19 2.28 2.37 2.46 2.56 2.67
Net Income 17,885 18,703 19,554 20,438 23,918 24,875
Dividends 212,214 220,122 228,346 236,899 231,394 240,644
Change in Working Capital (6,523) (6,788) (7,065) (7,352) (7,652) (7,963)
Capital Expenditures 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciation 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 0 0
Extras:
Amt. Preop. & Org. Cos 0 0 0 0 0 0
Debt Repayment 0 0 0 0 0 0
FCFe 263,576 272,037 280,835 289,985 247,660 257,556
Discounted FCFe 13,751 12,244 10,905 9,715 7,158 6,422
Appendix B
This appendix contains additional sensitivity analysis. The following
figures are included:
Figure 35. Sensitivity to Equity Participation.
Figure 36. Sensitivity to construction Period.
Figure 37. Sensitivity to Time Delays.
Figure 38. Sensitivity to Unleveraged Beta.
Figure 39. Sensitivity to Capacity Utilization.
Figure 40. Sensitivity to Interest Rate on Debt.
Figure 41. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Alumina Price
$200/ton Construction Period 3-yrs.
Figure 42. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Alumina Price
$275/ton Construction Period 3-yrs.
Figure 43. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Alumina Price
$350/ton Construction Period 3-yrs.
Figure 44. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Alumina Price
$200/ton Construction Period 5-yrs.
Figure 45. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Alumina Price
$275/ton Construction Period 5-yrs.
Figure 46. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Alumina Price
$350/ton Construction Period 5-yrs.
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Figure 35. Sensitivity to Equity Participation.
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Figure 36. Sensitivity to Construction Period.
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Figure 37. Sensitivity to Time Delays.
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Figure 38. Sensitivity to Unleveraged Beta.
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Figure 39. Sensitivity to Capacity Utilization.
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Figure 40. Sensitivity to interest Rate on Debt.
Cumulative NPV ($'000)
Years 25
08%
6 9%
X 10%
50000
-50000
-100000
-150000
-200000
-250000
Figure 41. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Alumina Price $200/ton.Construction Period 3
yrs.
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Figure 42. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Alumina Price $275/ton. Construction Period 3.
yrs.
NPV ($millions)
Bauxite Costs ($/ton)
25 -- 40
- $400/ton
$500/ton
$600/ton
$700/ton
- $800/ton
~~~ $900/ton
$1,000/ton
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
-50
-100
-150
-200
Figure 43. NPV for Different Bauxite Costs. Alumina Price $350/ton. Construction Period 3-yrs.
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Figure 44. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Alumina Price $200/ton. Construction Period 5
yrs.
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Figure 45. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Alumina Price $275/ton. Construction Period 5
Figure 45. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Alumina Price $275/ton. Construction Period 5.
yrs.
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Figure 46. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Alumina Price $350/ton. Construction Period 5
Figure 46. NPV for Different Investment Costs. Alumina Price $350/ton. Construction Period 5.
yrs.
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